Kube Descheduler Operator
Monthly
The system CA trust store shipped in Red Hat's ca-certificates RPM packages includes eMudhra root authorities that signed intermediate CA certificates protected by weak private keys, so a man-in-the-middle attacker who can intercept traffic and who can factor or guess those keys could mint certificates for arbitrary hostnames that TLS clients using the system trust store would accept (CVSS 6.8, CWE-295). Affected platforms span Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 through 10 plus a long list of layered products such as OpenShift Container Platform 4, Satellite 6, Quay 3, Advanced Cluster Management, and the cert-manager and logging operators. Attackers need a privileged network position and a victim client that actually initiates a TLS connection validated against the system store, so this is a trust-anchoring and impersonation problem rather than a remotely reachable code-execution flaw; there is no availability impact and no public exploit code identified at time of analysis. Because individual intermediate certificates cannot be selectively distrusted across every consumer of the system store, Red Hat is removing the parent root CAs outright, which is the crux of the remediation.
The system CA trust store shipped in Red Hat's ca-certificates RPM packages includes eMudhra root authorities that signed intermediate CA certificates protected by weak private keys, so a man-in-the-middle attacker who can intercept traffic and who can factor or guess those keys could mint certificates for arbitrary hostnames that TLS clients using the system trust store would accept (CVSS 6.8, CWE-295). Affected platforms span Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 through 10 plus a long list of layered products such as OpenShift Container Platform 4, Satellite 6, Quay 3, Advanced Cluster Management, and the cert-manager and logging operators. Attackers need a privileged network position and a victim client that actually initiates a TLS connection validated against the system store, so this is a trust-anchoring and impersonation problem rather than a remotely reachable code-execution flaw; there is no availability impact and no public exploit code identified at time of analysis. Because individual intermediate certificates cannot be selectively distrusted across every consumer of the system store, Red Hat is removing the parent root CAs outright, which is the crux of the remediation.