Kiota

Build-time SSRF, remote file inclusion, and local file inclusion in Microsoft Kiota before 1.32.5 lets an attacker-controlled OpenAPI description force the `kiota generate` command to fetch arbitrary remote http(s) URLs and read local absolute or out-of-tree file paths while resolving $ref values. Because Kiota inlined those external schemas into generated clients, an attacker could exfiltrate internal endpoints or leak local file contents (e.g. REMOTE_KIOTA_PROP-style properties) into produced code. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis; the risk is developer/CI-toolchain oriented and requires a developer to run generation against a malicious or influenced description (CVSS 7.1).

Path traversal and code injection in Microsoft Kiota before 1.32.5 lets an attacker-controlled OpenAPI description write generated source files outside the intended output directory and inject arbitrary text into class/namespace declarations. When a developer runs `kiota generate` without the -c/--class-name flag, Kiota consumes the clientClassName and clientNamespaceName values from the OpenAPI `x-ms-kiota-info` extension without identifier or path sanitization, using them both as code identifiers and as filesystem path components. There is no public exploit identified at time of analysis and no CISA KEV listing, though the fix (SanitizeClientClassName/SanitizeClientNamespaceName) is visible in the merged patch.

Path traversal in Microsoft Kiota before 1.32.5 lets an attacker-controlled OpenAPI description inject unvalidated `static_template.file` values (via the x-ai-adaptive-card and x-ai-capabilities extensions) into generated Microsoft 365 Copilot and Teams plugin manifests, so a developer who runs `kiota plugin add` or `kiota plugin generate -t APIPlugin` against a malicious spec produces a manifest that resolves files outside its package when deployed. Rated CVSS 4.0 9.3 (Critical) with high confidentiality/integrity/availability impact and no privileges required. There is no public exploit identified at time of analysis and it is not listed in CISA KEV; the upstream fix is confirmed in release v1.32.5.

Command injection in Microsoft Kiota before 1.32.5 lets a malicious or compromised OpenAPI description dictate the install command that Kiota presents to developers. When a developer runs `kiota info` (or the VS Code extension's `kiota info --json` dependency-install flow) against an attacker-controlled spec, Kiota reads the `x-ms-kiota-info.languagesInformation.<language>.dependencyInstallCommand` field plus attacker-chosen dependency name/version values and surfaces them as its trusted recommended install command, achieving arbitrary command execution when that command is run. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis and it is not in CISA KEV, but the fix explicitly removes the untrusted extension field.

Arbitrary file write via path traversal in Microsoft Kiota (OpenAPI HTTP client/plugin code generator) before 1.32.5 allows a malicious repository or pull request to place files outside the workspace root on a developer or CI host. The tool trusts the checked-in .kiota/workspace.json and honors attacker-controlled per-client and per-plugin outputPath values during 'kiota client generate' and 'kiota plugin generate' without validating them. No public exploit identified at time of analysis and the flaw is not in CISA KEV, but exploitation is realistic in CI/pull-request workflows since it only requires a developer to run generation against poisoned config.

We need to produce a JSON object. All fields are plain text strings. We must synthesize from all provided data. We have CVE-2026-59859, affecting Kiota's PHP generator, code injection via unescaped $ in double-quoted literals. Patch available. EPSS 1.02%, percentile 59%. CVSS vector: 4.0. Need to compute assessed CVSS 3.1 and 4.0 independently based on description. SSVC: Exploitation none, Automatable no, Technical impact total. Tags: PHP, RCE, Code Injection, Kiota. KEV not mentioned, so not in KEV. So no active exploitation confirmed. POC? Not mentioned as public. So no public exploit identified? But note that it's a code generation literal injection; exploit could be crafted spec. I'll follow rule: "no public exploit identified at time of analysis". Patch available from vendor. Fix in Kiota version 1.32.4. NuGet packages: Microsoft.OpenApi.Kiota and Microsoft.OpenApi.Kiota.Builder, both fixed in 1.32.4. So remediation: upgrade to version 1.32.4. Affected products: Microsoft Kiota (CPE cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:kiota:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*) prior to 1.32.4. References: GitHub advisory, PR, commit, release tag. For summary: synthesize. Not copy description. Start with impact verb and product. E.g. "Code injection via malicious OpenAPI specs in Microsoft Kiota PHP generator < 1.32.4 allows arbitrary PHP code execution." Mention attacker controls OpenAPI spec, generated code contains unescaped $ leading to PHP interpolation. Mention if actively exploited? KEV no, so "not known to be actively exploited". EPSS low (1.02%) suggesting low probability. So summary: "Code injection vulnerability in Microsoft Kiota's PHP code generator allows attackers who control OpenAPI specifications to inject arbitrary PHP code into generated client classes. Versions before 1.32.4 embed schema-derived strings without escaping the dollar sign ($), enabling PHP double-quoted string interpolation at runtime." Mention exploitation conditions: requires attacker to provide a crafted OpenAPI spec, whic

Code injection in Microsoft Kiota's Python client generator (versions prior to 1.32.0) allows an attacker who controls an OpenAPI description to embed arbitrary Python that executes when a developer generates and imports the resulting client. The flaw stems from unsanitized x-ms-enum.values[].description strings being emitted as inline comments; embedded newlines break out of the comment and run at module scope. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, and the issue is not in CISA KEV. The assigned CVSS 3.1 base score is 7.5, though its impact metrics (C:N/I:N/A:H) understate what is functionally full code execution.

Code injection in Microsoft Kiota Ruby code generator allows remote code execution through crafted OpenAPI specifications. Kiota versions prior to 1.32.0 fail to escape '#' characters in schema-derived strings embedded in Ruby double-quoted literals, enabling Ruby interpolation sequences such as '#{code}' to execute arbitrary commands when the generated client code runs. While no active exploitation is confirmed, the attack is automatable, EPSS indicates moderate probability (1.47%), and the vendor has released a fix.

We need to produce a comprehensive JSON analysis. The user asks for a senior vulnerability analyst synthesis across multiple intelligence sources. The provided data includes CVE description, CVSS (4.0 vector), CWE-94, EPSS 1.02% (59th percentile), patch available, CPE, tags (RCE, Code Injection, Kiota), SSVC: exploitation POC, automatable yes, technical impact total. References: GitHub security advisory, PR, commit, release tag, VulDB, NVD, EUVD. Source code evidence from PR diff. We must extract product_name: "Kiota" (Microsoft Kiota, but simply "Kiota" is fine; "Microsoft Kiota" is three words, but the rule says "1-3 words ONLY. The specific product or service name affected. Examples: 'Apache Tomcat', 'WordPress', 'Linux Kernel', 'nginx-ui', 'GoAnywhere MFT'. NOT the vulnerability type, NOT the vendor alone, NOT a description." So product name is "Kiota". Could also be "Microsoft Kiota" (2-3 words). I'll go with "Microsoft Kiota" (2 words) to be precise, but the examples show "Apache Tomcat", "GoAnywhere MFT". So "Microsoft Kiota" is appropriate. That is exactly the product. The vulnerability is in the C# code generator. Affected package: nuget/Microsoft.OpenApi.Kiota and Builder. So product_name: "Microsoft Kiota". That's 2 words, okay. Summary: Need to synthesize, not copy description. Start with impact verb and product. E.g., "Code injection in Microsoft Kiota allows attackers to inject arbitrary C# code into generated HTTP clients." Must include version affected (<1.32.3), what attacker can do. Mention if actively exploited (KEV status isn't provided, but tags include RCE, but KEV is not listed. The input does not have a KEV field. So we should not claim KEV. The SSVC says exploitation: poc, meaning proof-of-concept exists. That's public but not actively exploited per KEV. So I'll state "publicly available exploit code exists" because SSVC says poc and advisory includes an example, and PR has tests showing injection. So summary: "Code injection in Microsoft

Code injection in Microsoft Kiota versions prior to 1.31.1 allows attackers who control or tamper with OpenAPI descriptions to inject malicious code into generated HTTP client libraries. Exploitation requires developers to generate clients from untrusted or compromised OpenAPI specifications, then compile and execute the poisoned code. The attack chain culminates in arbitrary code execution within the context of applications using the tainted generated clients. CVSS 7.3 with local attack vector and user interaction required suggests lower immediate urgency, though EPSS data is unavailable. No public exploit code or active exploitation confirmed at time of analysis.