Keploy
Monthly
Unauthenticated exposure of live TLS session keys in Keploy 3.1.0-3.6.25 allows any network-reachable attacker to decrypt recorded application TLS traffic by calling the agent control-plane's /agent/pcap/keylog endpoint, which streams NSS keylog lines without any authentication gate. The root cause is the agent HTTP server binding to 0.0.0.0 (all interfaces) rather than loopback, as confirmed by the patch commit diff. Additional endpoints /agent/stop and /agent/storemocks allow unauthenticated manipulation of test recording sessions. No public exploit code or CISA KEV listing has been identified at time of analysis, though exploitation requires only a standard HTTP client.
Unauthenticated exposure of live TLS session keys in Keploy 3.1.0-3.6.25 allows any network-reachable attacker to decrypt recorded application TLS traffic by calling the agent control-plane's /agent/pcap/keylog endpoint, which streams NSS keylog lines without any authentication gate. The root cause is the agent HTTP server binding to 0.0.0.0 (all interfaces) rather than loopback, as confirmed by the patch commit diff. Additional endpoints /agent/stop and /agent/storemocks allow unauthenticated manipulation of test recording sessions. No public exploit code or CISA KEV listing has been identified at time of analysis, though exploitation requires only a standard HTTP client.