Jupyterlite Core
Monthly
Improper trust attribution in JupyterLab's markdownviewer:trust and notebook:trust command-link handlers lets a Trust decision apply to the wrong document: the handler resolves the target via tracker.currentWidget when the user answers the dialog instead of retaining the document whose command button was clicked, so a second document that becomes current during the prompt is marked trusted while the original remains untrusted. The result is that command buttons in the incorrectly trusted document later run without any prompt, and for notebooks trust also marks all cells trusted, saves unsaved edits, and writes the server signature to disk. Per the assessed vector (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N, score 4.2) this is a narrow race that requires the user to actively answer Trust and requires a second document to become current in the window between the click and the answer; no public exploit identified at time of analysis, and vendor fixes are available in 4.5.11 and 4.6.4.
Improper trust attribution in JupyterLab's markdownviewer:trust and notebook:trust command-link handlers lets a Trust decision apply to the wrong document: the handler resolves the target via tracker.currentWidget when the user answers the dialog instead of retaining the document whose command button was clicked, so a second document that becomes current during the prompt is marked trusted while the original remains untrusted. The result is that command buttons in the incorrectly trusted document later run without any prompt, and for notebooks trust also marks all cells trusted, saves unsaved edits, and writes the server signature to disk. Per the assessed vector (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N, score 4.2) this is a narrow race that requires the user to actively answer Trust and requires a second document to become current in the window between the click and the answer; no public exploit identified at time of analysis, and vendor fixes are available in 4.5.11 and 4.6.4.