Json Scada
Monthly
SQL injection in JSON-SCADA releases before 0.65-alpha lets an authenticated user inject arbitrary SQL through the OPC historian HistoryRead API implemented by opcApi() in src/server_realtime_auth/index.js, by supplying crafted NodeId.Id, StartTime or EndTime values in a HistoryReadRequest. Because stacked statements are accepted, an attacker with any valid account can read, modify or delete historian data across all locations irrespective of their assigned role, giving high confidentiality, integrity and availability impact to the historian. Exploitation requires network reach to the HistoryRead endpoint plus valid credentials (CVSS 4.0 PR:L, aligned with an assessed CVSS 3.1 vector of AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H); no public exploit code is identified at time of analysis, the issue is not in CISA KEV, and VulnCheck reporting places remediation in the current weekly patch cycle rather than an emergency response.
SQL injection in JSON-SCADA releases before 0.65-alpha lets an authenticated user inject arbitrary SQL through the OPC historian HistoryRead API implemented by opcApi() in src/server_realtime_auth/index.js, by supplying crafted NodeId.Id, StartTime or EndTime values in a HistoryReadRequest. Because stacked statements are accepted, an attacker with any valid account can read, modify or delete historian data across all locations irrespective of their assigned role, giving high confidentiality, integrity and availability impact to the historian. Exploitation requires network reach to the HistoryRead endpoint plus valid credentials (CVSS 4.0 PR:L, aligned with an assessed CVSS 3.1 vector of AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H); no public exploit code is identified at time of analysis, the issue is not in CISA KEV, and VulnCheck reporting places remediation in the current weekly patch cycle rather than an emergency response.