Joyland Ai
Monthly
JavaScript injection into the WebView of the Joyland AI app (all versions, tracked as CPE cpe:2.3:a:joyland:joyland.ai:*) lets an attacker who shares a network position with the victim and can intercept or tamper with content loaded into the app run arbitrary script inside the app's privileged context; no authentication is required and no user interaction is needed. In the default, unpermissioned install state the attacker can read the device clipboard, make arbitrary HTTP requests through the Weex 'stream' module, and reach app-internal storage, while on devices that previously granted camera, microphone, location, or storage permissions the same flaw escalates to full filesystem, camera, microphone, and GPS access. No public exploit code and no confirmed active exploitation were identified at time of analysis, and no vendor-released patch has been identified; the CVSS 4.0 base score is 9.0 (Critical) and EPSS data was not provided for this record.
Improper TLS certificate validation in the Joyland AI app causes its invisible advertisement WebView to accept invalid or forged SSL certificates by default, letting an attacker who already sits on the victim's network path silently intercept and alter the content flowing through that ad channel. All versions of the app appear affected (CPE cpe:2.3:a:joyland:joyland.ai:* and EUVD lists the version range as '*'), and the CVSS 4.0 vector provided is AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N, meaning no authentication or user interaction is required once a man-in-the-middle position is established. Exploitation is not confirmed in the wild (not listed in CISA KEV) and no public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis, but the real-world barrier is the requirement for an interception position such as a hostile Wi-Fi hotspot, ARP spoofing, or an upstream network foothold; our independent assessment rates this as CVSS 3.1 AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N, i.e. lower practical ease than the 6.9 base score suggested by the input vector, with impact bounded to the advertisement WebView rather than the full application.
Cleartext transmission of application traffic in the Joyland AI Android app exposes data to on-path attackers positioned on the same LAN or Wi-Fi segment, because the app explicitly opts into cleartext HTTP on Android 9+ where the platform default blocks it. Only data the app actually sends over plain HTTP is exposed, and the exposure is passive disclosure - no code execution, account takeover, or data modification results - with authentication not required (CVSS vector PR:N) and confidentiality impact scored low. No public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis (no public exploit identified at time of analysis), and no CISA KEV listing or EPSS signal was provided; the practical attack prerequisite is an adjacent-network or on-path foothold, which excludes remote internet-only attackers.
The Joyland.ai application fails to validate the hostname in TLS certificates presented by the server, allowing an attacker who already occupies a man-in-the-middle position on the network path to impersonate the Joyland.ai backend and read or manipulate chat traffic. All versions of the app appear affected (CPE cpe:2.3:a:joyland:joyland.ai:* and EUVD-2026-91028 both list the wildcard version range). Exploitation is gated by the attacker's need to interpose on the connection (rogue AP, shared Wi-Fi, ARP/DNS spoofing, or compromised segment), which is why the independent assessment rates it CVSS 3.1 AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N rather than the higher CVSS 4.0 6.9 reported by CISA; no public exploit has been identified at time of analysis and the issue is not in CISA KEV.
Man-in-the-middle interception of traffic between the Joyland AI application and its backend is possible because the app accepts any TLS certificate from any server without validating it (CWE-295), exposing transported data to an on-path attacker who can silently decrypt or alter it. Every user of an affected Joyland.ai release is vulnerable by default - no special victim-side configuration is required - but the attacker must first obtain an on-path position (shared or rogue Wi-Fi, a compromised gateway, or ARP/DNS spoofing) and present a forged certificate; the flaw cannot be triggered purely over the internet. No public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis and the issue is not listed in CISA KEV; the vendor-reported CVSS 4.0 base score is 6.9, while our independent CVSS 3.1 reassessment treats the lost confidentiality and integrity of intercepted traffic as high impact with the on-path requirement as the primary limiting factor (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N).
Hard-coded GeTui push-service credentials embedded in the Joyland AI client app let anyone who extracts them from a copy of the binary call the GeTui REST API without authenticating to Joyland and push arbitrary notification content to individual users, chosen groups, or the app's entire user base. The flaw applies to all observed versions of Joyland.ai (CPE cpe:2.3:a:joyland:joyland.ai:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*), and exploitation is unauthenticated from the network perspective (CVSS vector PR:N/AC:L/UI:N) - the only practical prerequisite is obtaining the app package and the credentials remaining valid. Impact is bounded to the push-notification channel: the attacker cannot read Joyland backend data or execute code, and no public exploit code or confirmed active exploitation was identified at time of analysis, so the primary risk is mass notification abuse, phishing lures, and brand/reputational damage rather than data compromise.
JavaScript injection into the WebView of the Joyland AI app (all versions, tracked as CPE cpe:2.3:a:joyland:joyland.ai:*) lets an attacker who shares a network position with the victim and can intercept or tamper with content loaded into the app run arbitrary script inside the app's privileged context; no authentication is required and no user interaction is needed. In the default, unpermissioned install state the attacker can read the device clipboard, make arbitrary HTTP requests through the Weex 'stream' module, and reach app-internal storage, while on devices that previously granted camera, microphone, location, or storage permissions the same flaw escalates to full filesystem, camera, microphone, and GPS access. No public exploit code and no confirmed active exploitation were identified at time of analysis, and no vendor-released patch has been identified; the CVSS 4.0 base score is 9.0 (Critical) and EPSS data was not provided for this record.
Improper TLS certificate validation in the Joyland AI app causes its invisible advertisement WebView to accept invalid or forged SSL certificates by default, letting an attacker who already sits on the victim's network path silently intercept and alter the content flowing through that ad channel. All versions of the app appear affected (CPE cpe:2.3:a:joyland:joyland.ai:* and EUVD lists the version range as '*'), and the CVSS 4.0 vector provided is AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N, meaning no authentication or user interaction is required once a man-in-the-middle position is established. Exploitation is not confirmed in the wild (not listed in CISA KEV) and no public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis, but the real-world barrier is the requirement for an interception position such as a hostile Wi-Fi hotspot, ARP spoofing, or an upstream network foothold; our independent assessment rates this as CVSS 3.1 AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N, i.e. lower practical ease than the 6.9 base score suggested by the input vector, with impact bounded to the advertisement WebView rather than the full application.
Cleartext transmission of application traffic in the Joyland AI Android app exposes data to on-path attackers positioned on the same LAN or Wi-Fi segment, because the app explicitly opts into cleartext HTTP on Android 9+ where the platform default blocks it. Only data the app actually sends over plain HTTP is exposed, and the exposure is passive disclosure - no code execution, account takeover, or data modification results - with authentication not required (CVSS vector PR:N) and confidentiality impact scored low. No public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis (no public exploit identified at time of analysis), and no CISA KEV listing or EPSS signal was provided; the practical attack prerequisite is an adjacent-network or on-path foothold, which excludes remote internet-only attackers.
The Joyland.ai application fails to validate the hostname in TLS certificates presented by the server, allowing an attacker who already occupies a man-in-the-middle position on the network path to impersonate the Joyland.ai backend and read or manipulate chat traffic. All versions of the app appear affected (CPE cpe:2.3:a:joyland:joyland.ai:* and EUVD-2026-91028 both list the wildcard version range). Exploitation is gated by the attacker's need to interpose on the connection (rogue AP, shared Wi-Fi, ARP/DNS spoofing, or compromised segment), which is why the independent assessment rates it CVSS 3.1 AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N rather than the higher CVSS 4.0 6.9 reported by CISA; no public exploit has been identified at time of analysis and the issue is not in CISA KEV.
Man-in-the-middle interception of traffic between the Joyland AI application and its backend is possible because the app accepts any TLS certificate from any server without validating it (CWE-295), exposing transported data to an on-path attacker who can silently decrypt or alter it. Every user of an affected Joyland.ai release is vulnerable by default - no special victim-side configuration is required - but the attacker must first obtain an on-path position (shared or rogue Wi-Fi, a compromised gateway, or ARP/DNS spoofing) and present a forged certificate; the flaw cannot be triggered purely over the internet. No public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis and the issue is not listed in CISA KEV; the vendor-reported CVSS 4.0 base score is 6.9, while our independent CVSS 3.1 reassessment treats the lost confidentiality and integrity of intercepted traffic as high impact with the on-path requirement as the primary limiting factor (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N).
Hard-coded GeTui push-service credentials embedded in the Joyland AI client app let anyone who extracts them from a copy of the binary call the GeTui REST API without authenticating to Joyland and push arbitrary notification content to individual users, chosen groups, or the app's entire user base. The flaw applies to all observed versions of Joyland.ai (CPE cpe:2.3:a:joyland:joyland.ai:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*), and exploitation is unauthenticated from the network perspective (CVSS vector PR:N/AC:L/UI:N) - the only practical prerequisite is obtaining the app package and the credentials remaining valid. Impact is bounded to the push-notification channel: the attacker cannot read Joyland backend data or execute code, and no public exploit code or confirmed active exploitation was identified at time of analysis, so the primary risk is mass notification abuse, phishing lures, and brand/reputational damage rather than data compromise.