Jellystat
Monthly
SQL injection in Jellystat versions prior to 1.1.10 escalates to remote code execution on the PostgreSQL database host. Authenticated attackers can inject arbitrary SQL via multiple API endpoints (`/api/getUserDetails`, `/api/getLibrary`), initially exfiltrating sensitive credentials from the `app_config` table (including Jellystat admin credentials and Jellyfin API keys). Because the application uses node-postgres simple query protocol allowing stacked queries, attackers can leverage PostgreSQL's `COPY ... TO PROGRAM` to achieve command execution on the database server. The project's default docker-compose.yml deploys PostgreSQL with superuser privileges, removing any privilege barriers to RCE. Vendor patch released in version 1.1.10 (GitHub commit 735fe7c confirmed). No active exploitation confirmed by CISA KEV, but publicly available exploit code exists given the detailed technical disclosure in GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-fj7c-2p5q-g56m.
SQL injection in Jellystat versions prior to 1.1.10 escalates to remote code execution on the PostgreSQL database host. Authenticated attackers can inject arbitrary SQL via multiple API endpoints (`/api/getUserDetails`, `/api/getLibrary`), initially exfiltrating sensitive credentials from the `app_config` table (including Jellystat admin credentials and Jellyfin API keys). Because the application uses node-postgres simple query protocol allowing stacked queries, attackers can leverage PostgreSQL's `COPY ... TO PROGRAM` to achieve command execution on the database server. The project's default docker-compose.yml deploys PostgreSQL with superuser privileges, removing any privilege barriers to RCE. Vendor patch released in version 1.1.10 (GitHub commit 735fe7c confirmed). No active exploitation confirmed by CISA KEV, but publicly available exploit code exists given the detailed technical disclosure in GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-fj7c-2p5q-g56m.