Handesk
Monthly
Broken access control in BadChoice Handesk (all versions through 2026-07-10) permits any authenticated agent to modify, escalate, or corrupt ticket records belonging to teams they have no membership in, by directly targeting the TicketsController@update endpoint. The endpoint performs neither an authorize() policy check nor a team-scoped ownership validation, meaning a low-privilege agent account is the only barrier to cross-team data tampering. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, but exploitation requires only a valid agent credential and a single crafted HTTP request, making this a low-friction privilege abuse risk in any multi-team deployment.
Cross-team lead record overwrite in BadChoice Handesk (all versions through 2026-07-10) is exploitable by any authenticated agent via the LeadsController@update endpoint, which performs no team-ownership authorization check. The Lead model's $guarded property is set to an empty array, disabling Laravel mass-assignment protection and allowing the attacker to set any column value on any lead record regardless of team boundary. No public exploit code or CISA KEV listing has been identified at time of analysis, but the PR:L/AC:L vector makes this trivially exploitable by any insider or compromised agent account in a multi-team deployment.
Broken access control in BadChoice Handesk (all versions through 2026-07-10) permits any authenticated agent to modify, escalate, or corrupt ticket records belonging to teams they have no membership in, by directly targeting the TicketsController@update endpoint. The endpoint performs neither an authorize() policy check nor a team-scoped ownership validation, meaning a low-privilege agent account is the only barrier to cross-team data tampering. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, but exploitation requires only a valid agent credential and a single crafted HTTP request, making this a low-friction privilege abuse risk in any multi-team deployment.
Cross-team lead record overwrite in BadChoice Handesk (all versions through 2026-07-10) is exploitable by any authenticated agent via the LeadsController@update endpoint, which performs no team-ownership authorization check. The Lead model's $guarded property is set to an empty array, disabling Laravel mass-assignment protection and allowing the attacker to set any column value on any lead record regardless of team boundary. No public exploit code or CISA KEV listing has been identified at time of analysis, but the PR:L/AC:L vector makes this trivially exploitable by any insider or compromised agent account in a multi-team deployment.