Goose
Monthly
Arbitrary command execution in goose v1.37.0 allows an attacker to embed shell commands inside recipe stdio extension definitions and retry.check fields that are silently executed under the victim user's OS privileges. The built-in recipe security scanner does not inspect these fields, providing a false safety guarantee and a clear bypass path. No public exploit is identified at time of analysis, but exploitation is low-complexity once a target user loads a malicious recipe.
Arbitrary command execution in the goose AI agent's `goose review` command allows a malicious Git repository to run attacker-controlled code on the host before any model interaction occurs. The vulnerability exists in versions prior to 1.44.0 and stems from goose invoking the system `git` binary without suppressing the `core.fsmonitor` configuration key, meaning a repository's `.git/config` can nominate an arbitrary command that Git then executes during index refresh. Exploitation requires only that a user runs `goose review` inside a malicious repository, and the injected command inherits the user's full environment - including provider API keys and filesystem access. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, though the fix commit and advisory are public.
Arbitrary command execution in goose v1.37.0 allows an attacker to embed shell commands inside recipe stdio extension definitions and retry.check fields that are silently executed under the victim user's OS privileges. The built-in recipe security scanner does not inspect these fields, providing a false safety guarantee and a clear bypass path. No public exploit is identified at time of analysis, but exploitation is low-complexity once a target user loads a malicious recipe.
Arbitrary command execution in the goose AI agent's `goose review` command allows a malicious Git repository to run attacker-controlled code on the host before any model interaction occurs. The vulnerability exists in versions prior to 1.44.0 and stems from goose invoking the system `git` binary without suppressing the `core.fsmonitor` configuration key, meaning a repository's `.git/config` can nominate an arbitrary command that Git then executes during index refresh. Exploitation requires only that a user runs `goose review` inside a malicious repository, and the injected command inherits the user's full environment - including provider API keys and filesystem access. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, though the fix commit and advisory are public.