Go Attestation
Monthly
Trusted measurement-list poisoning in Google go-attestation through 0.6.0 lets a remote actor who controls a TPM event log fed to an attestation verifier inject arbitrary SHA256 hashes into the verifier's trusted hash database. Because parseEfiSignatureList() never advances past the EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST SignatureHeaderSize vendor bytes, those attacker-chosen bytes are accepted as legitimate hash entries, allowing a compromised boot state to be attested as healthy. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, but the fix is upstream in v0.6.1 and the root cause is documented in GHSA-9r4w-jg96-92mv.
Uncontrolled recursion in Google go-attestation's Windows SIPA event log parser allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to crash any verifier application built on versions up to and including 0.6.1. The `readELAMAggregation` function in `attest/win_events.go` recurses for every nested `elamAggregation` sub-event without enforcing a maximum depth, and a size-guard bypass on recursive execution paths means even bounded input can drive unbounded stack growth. Submitting a crafted Windows event log with deeply nested ELAM headers exhausts the goroutine call stack, triggering an unrecoverable Go runtime panic that immediately terminates the verifier process. No public exploit or active exploitation (CISA KEV) has been identified at time of analysis, though a working proof-of-concept test case is embedded in the upstream fix PR.
Trusted measurement-list poisoning in Google go-attestation through 0.6.0 lets a remote actor who controls a TPM event log fed to an attestation verifier inject arbitrary SHA256 hashes into the verifier's trusted hash database. Because parseEfiSignatureList() never advances past the EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST SignatureHeaderSize vendor bytes, those attacker-chosen bytes are accepted as legitimate hash entries, allowing a compromised boot state to be attested as healthy. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, but the fix is upstream in v0.6.1 and the root cause is documented in GHSA-9r4w-jg96-92mv.
Uncontrolled recursion in Google go-attestation's Windows SIPA event log parser allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to crash any verifier application built on versions up to and including 0.6.1. The `readELAMAggregation` function in `attest/win_events.go` recurses for every nested `elamAggregation` sub-event without enforcing a maximum depth, and a size-guard bypass on recursive execution paths means even bounded input can drive unbounded stack growth. Submitting a crafted Windows event log with deeply nested ELAM headers exhausts the goroutine call stack, triggering an unrecoverable Go runtime panic that immediately terminates the verifier process. No public exploit or active exploitation (CISA KEV) has been identified at time of analysis, though a working proof-of-concept test case is embedded in the upstream fix PR.