Epa3 Service Opensource
Monthly
AES-GCM nonce reuse in ePA3-Service-OpenSource (all versions prior to 1.3.0) allows a network-positioned attacker to recover plaintext patient health records and forge authenticated VAU protocol messages. The frozen `request_counter` in `VAUProtokoll.py` causes every outgoing message to be encrypted under the same nonce-key pair, breaking AES-GCM's fundamental security guarantee. No public exploit code is confirmed at time of analysis, but the underlying Joux forbidden attack is well-documented in cryptographic literature, and the affected data - Germany's national electronic patient records - carries exceptional regulatory and clinical sensitivity.
TLS certificate verification is globally disabled in fbeta-GmbH's ePA3-Service-OpenSource prior to version 1.3.0, exposing all traffic between the integration service and Germany's electronic patient record system and Konnektor devices to interception by network-positioned attackers. Both the primary TLS layer - via hardcoded `verify=False` in Python requests sessions across two independent modules - and the VAU protocol's application-layer certificate validation are broken simultaneously, eliminating all cryptographic trust anchors with no defense-in-depth fallback. On the Konnektor communication path, an impersonating attacker can additionally capture the client's mutual TLS certificate exchange and observe smartcard operations. No public exploit or CISA KEV listing exists at time of analysis.
TLS/VAU man-in-the-middle in fbeta GmbH's ePA 3.x Integration (ePA3-Service-OpenSource) before 1.3.0 lets an on-path attacker impersonate the VAU server for Germany's electronic patient record (ePA). Because app/vau/VAUProtokoll.py validates the signed_vau_server_pub_keys and AUT_VAU_CertData chain against attacker-suppliable material (a circular trust relationship) and TLS certificate verification is additionally disabled, an attacker between the DiGA backend and the ePA system can negotiate the session keys and read or alter all encrypted VAU traffic, including Medical Information Objects. CVSS 9.1; no public exploit identified at time of analysis, though the upstream fix commit and PR are public.
CRLF injection in ePA 3.x Integration's VAU inner HTTP request builder allows an authenticated attacker to inject arbitrary headers into encrypted tunnel requests destined for Germany's electronic patient record (ePA) backend, potentially exposing other patients' medical records or bypassing authorization controls. The flaw exists in the build_inner_header function of app/vau/VAUProtokoll.py, which interpolates user-controlled values - including insurant_id and USER_AGENT - directly into raw HTTP header strings without stripping carriage-return or line-feed characters. No public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis, and the issue is fixed in release 1.3.0.
AES-GCM nonce reuse in ePA3-Service-OpenSource (all versions prior to 1.3.0) allows a network-positioned attacker to recover plaintext patient health records and forge authenticated VAU protocol messages. The frozen `request_counter` in `VAUProtokoll.py` causes every outgoing message to be encrypted under the same nonce-key pair, breaking AES-GCM's fundamental security guarantee. No public exploit code is confirmed at time of analysis, but the underlying Joux forbidden attack is well-documented in cryptographic literature, and the affected data - Germany's national electronic patient records - carries exceptional regulatory and clinical sensitivity.
TLS certificate verification is globally disabled in fbeta-GmbH's ePA3-Service-OpenSource prior to version 1.3.0, exposing all traffic between the integration service and Germany's electronic patient record system and Konnektor devices to interception by network-positioned attackers. Both the primary TLS layer - via hardcoded `verify=False` in Python requests sessions across two independent modules - and the VAU protocol's application-layer certificate validation are broken simultaneously, eliminating all cryptographic trust anchors with no defense-in-depth fallback. On the Konnektor communication path, an impersonating attacker can additionally capture the client's mutual TLS certificate exchange and observe smartcard operations. No public exploit or CISA KEV listing exists at time of analysis.
TLS/VAU man-in-the-middle in fbeta GmbH's ePA 3.x Integration (ePA3-Service-OpenSource) before 1.3.0 lets an on-path attacker impersonate the VAU server for Germany's electronic patient record (ePA). Because app/vau/VAUProtokoll.py validates the signed_vau_server_pub_keys and AUT_VAU_CertData chain against attacker-suppliable material (a circular trust relationship) and TLS certificate verification is additionally disabled, an attacker between the DiGA backend and the ePA system can negotiate the session keys and read or alter all encrypted VAU traffic, including Medical Information Objects. CVSS 9.1; no public exploit identified at time of analysis, though the upstream fix commit and PR are public.
CRLF injection in ePA 3.x Integration's VAU inner HTTP request builder allows an authenticated attacker to inject arbitrary headers into encrypted tunnel requests destined for Germany's electronic patient record (ePA) backend, potentially exposing other patients' medical records or bypassing authorization controls. The flaw exists in the build_inner_header function of app/vau/VAUProtokoll.py, which interpolates user-controlled values - including insurant_id and USER_AGENT - directly into raw HTTP header strings without stripping carriage-return or line-feed characters. No public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis, and the issue is fixed in release 1.3.0.