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Enclave Os Mini

1 CVEs product

Monthly

CVE-2026-108265 Oct 09, 20:55 CRITICAL Act Now

Attestation bypass in PrivaSys Enclave OS Mini before wasm-v0.40.0 allows an attacker who already possesses a valid enclave RA-TLS private key to relay a genuine SGX/TDX attestation quote onto a TLS connection the attacker terminates, so a relying party accepts an attacker-controlled channel as the attested enclave. The root cause is a missing TLS-session channel binding (CWE-346): in challenge-response mode the quote's ReportData folded only the certificate public-key hash and the client nonce, so nothing in the quote committed to the specific handshake, making a relayed quote valid on any connection. CVSS 4.0 rates this 9.1 (network reachable, unauthenticated per PR:N, no user interaction, high confidentiality and integrity impact), but the independent assessment (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N) and the AT:P metric correctly temper it: exploitation presupposes a prior enclave key compromise and a challenge-mode deployment, and no public exploit has been identified at time of analysis.

Information Disclosure Intel Enclave Os Mini
NVD GitHub
CVSS 4.0
9.1
EPSS
0.1%
EPSS 0% CVSS 9.1
CRITICAL Act Now

Attestation bypass in PrivaSys Enclave OS Mini before wasm-v0.40.0 allows an attacker who already possesses a valid enclave RA-TLS private key to relay a genuine SGX/TDX attestation quote onto a TLS connection the attacker terminates, so a relying party accepts an attacker-controlled channel as the attested enclave. The root cause is a missing TLS-session channel binding (CWE-346): in challenge-response mode the quote's ReportData folded only the certificate public-key hash and the client nonce, so nothing in the quote committed to the specific handshake, making a relayed quote valid on any connection. CVSS 4.0 rates this 9.1 (network reachable, unauthenticated per PR:N, no user interaction, high confidentiality and integrity impact), but the independent assessment (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N) and the AT:P metric correctly temper it: exploitation presupposes a prior enclave key compromise and a challenge-mode deployment, and no public exploit has been identified at time of analysis.

Information Disclosure Intel Enclave Os Mini
NVD GitHub

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