Delight Custom Firmware
Monthly
Command injection in the Delight Custom Firmware (CFW) for Nokia Symbian Belle devices lets a local attacker place a crafted .txt file in the device's :\Data directory that the firmware's startup mechanism parses and executes as a boot script, yielding code execution at boot. All affected builds are covered - Delight v1.8 on the Nokia 808, v6.7 on the N8 and C7, v1.3 on the E7, v1.2 on the 700 and 500, v1.1 on the 701, and v1.0 on the 603, E6, Oro, and Vertu Constellation T. Exploitation is unauthenticated but strictly local: it requires write access to :\Data (typically via USB mass-storage mode or an on-device file manager) plus a device reboot to trigger the injected script, and no public exploit code or active exploitation has been identified at time of analysis. NVD scores this 5.1 (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N), while this assessment rates the impact higher (C:H/I:H/A:H) given that boot-script execution runs with firmware privileges; real-world risk remains LOW-to-MODERATE because the affected platform is long-discontinued, niche custom firmware with no default remote exposure.
Command injection in the Delight Custom Firmware (CFW) for Nokia Symbian Belle devices lets a local attacker place a crafted .txt file in the device's :\Data directory that the firmware's startup mechanism parses and executes as a boot script, yielding code execution at boot. All affected builds are covered - Delight v1.8 on the Nokia 808, v6.7 on the N8 and C7, v1.3 on the E7, v1.2 on the 700 and 500, v1.1 on the 701, and v1.0 on the 603, E6, Oro, and Vertu Constellation T. Exploitation is unauthenticated but strictly local: it requires write access to :\Data (typically via USB mass-storage mode or an on-device file manager) plus a device reboot to trigger the injected script, and no public exploit code or active exploitation has been identified at time of analysis. NVD scores this 5.1 (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N), while this assessment rates the impact higher (C:H/I:H/A:H) given that boot-script execution runs with firmware privileges; real-world risk remains LOW-to-MODERATE because the affected platform is long-discontinued, niche custom firmware with no default remote exposure.