Confidential Compute Attestation
Monthly
Elevated-privilege container restoration in CRI-O 1.34 and later, including downstream Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.17+, lets an authenticated Kubernetes user who can create a pod from a crafted checkpoint image bypass the destination pod's security context. The restored process keeps credentials, Linux capabilities, no_new_privs and seccomp state stored in the checkpoint instead of the destination configuration, allowing execution across the container security boundary. Exploitation requires non-default checkpoint/restore (CRIU) support to be enabled and RBAC permission to create pods from malicious checkpoints; no public exploit code is identified and no vendor-released fix is available at time of analysis, so the vendor CVSS 3.1 score of 8.8 overstates urgency given those prerequisites (our assessment raises attack complexity to High).
Privilege escalation in CRI-O (the OCI container runtime used by Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4 and many Kubernetes clusters) lets an attacker who can set container environment variables inject a newline into the HOME variable and append arbitrary lines to /etc/passwd, enabling creation of a rootful or otherwise privileged account inside the container. It is a bypass of the incomplete fix for CVE-2022-4318, whose HOME sanitization was insufficient. No public exploit identified at time of analysis and it is not listed in CISA KEV.
The system CA trust store shipped in Red Hat's ca-certificates RPM packages includes eMudhra root authorities that signed intermediate CA certificates protected by weak private keys, so a man-in-the-middle attacker who can intercept traffic and who can factor or guess those keys could mint certificates for arbitrary hostnames that TLS clients using the system trust store would accept (CVSS 6.8, CWE-295). Affected platforms span Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 through 10 plus a long list of layered products such as OpenShift Container Platform 4, Satellite 6, Quay 3, Advanced Cluster Management, and the cert-manager and logging operators. Attackers need a privileged network position and a victim client that actually initiates a TLS connection validated against the system store, so this is a trust-anchoring and impersonation problem rather than a remotely reachable code-execution flaw; there is no availability impact and no public exploit code identified at time of analysis. Because individual intermediate certificates cannot be selectively distrusted across every consumer of the system store, Red Hat is removing the parent root CAs outright, which is the crux of the remediation.
A file descriptor leak in the containers/storage Go library's archive.ApplyLayer and ApplyUncompressedLayer functions causes descriptors to be left open whenever corrupt or malicious image layers or tar streams are unpacked, and repeated processing of such inputs can exhaust the hosting process's file descriptor limit. The weakness is unauthenticated in CVSS terms (PR:N) but local in scope (AV:L) and requires the victim to actually process attacker-influenced layers (UI:R), so an attacker must first get malformed image content in front of a build, pull, or sync loop. Impact is availability-only and confined to the affected process (C:N/I:N/A:L, S:U): no code execution and no data exposure; a single bad input does not cause denial of service, only sustained repetition does. No public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis and the issue is not in CISA KEV, and EPSS scoring was not supplied with the source data.
Elevated-privilege container restoration in CRI-O 1.34 and later, including downstream Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.17+, lets an authenticated Kubernetes user who can create a pod from a crafted checkpoint image bypass the destination pod's security context. The restored process keeps credentials, Linux capabilities, no_new_privs and seccomp state stored in the checkpoint instead of the destination configuration, allowing execution across the container security boundary. Exploitation requires non-default checkpoint/restore (CRIU) support to be enabled and RBAC permission to create pods from malicious checkpoints; no public exploit code is identified and no vendor-released fix is available at time of analysis, so the vendor CVSS 3.1 score of 8.8 overstates urgency given those prerequisites (our assessment raises attack complexity to High).
Privilege escalation in CRI-O (the OCI container runtime used by Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4 and many Kubernetes clusters) lets an attacker who can set container environment variables inject a newline into the HOME variable and append arbitrary lines to /etc/passwd, enabling creation of a rootful or otherwise privileged account inside the container. It is a bypass of the incomplete fix for CVE-2022-4318, whose HOME sanitization was insufficient. No public exploit identified at time of analysis and it is not listed in CISA KEV.
The system CA trust store shipped in Red Hat's ca-certificates RPM packages includes eMudhra root authorities that signed intermediate CA certificates protected by weak private keys, so a man-in-the-middle attacker who can intercept traffic and who can factor or guess those keys could mint certificates for arbitrary hostnames that TLS clients using the system trust store would accept (CVSS 6.8, CWE-295). Affected platforms span Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 through 10 plus a long list of layered products such as OpenShift Container Platform 4, Satellite 6, Quay 3, Advanced Cluster Management, and the cert-manager and logging operators. Attackers need a privileged network position and a victim client that actually initiates a TLS connection validated against the system store, so this is a trust-anchoring and impersonation problem rather than a remotely reachable code-execution flaw; there is no availability impact and no public exploit code identified at time of analysis. Because individual intermediate certificates cannot be selectively distrusted across every consumer of the system store, Red Hat is removing the parent root CAs outright, which is the crux of the remediation.
A file descriptor leak in the containers/storage Go library's archive.ApplyLayer and ApplyUncompressedLayer functions causes descriptors to be left open whenever corrupt or malicious image layers or tar streams are unpacked, and repeated processing of such inputs can exhaust the hosting process's file descriptor limit. The weakness is unauthenticated in CVSS terms (PR:N) but local in scope (AV:L) and requires the victim to actually process attacker-influenced layers (UI:R), so an attacker must first get malformed image content in front of a build, pull, or sync loop. Impact is availability-only and confined to the affected process (C:N/I:N/A:L, S:U): no code execution and no data exposure; a single bad input does not cause denial of service, only sustained repetition does. No public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis and the issue is not in CISA KEV, and EPSS scoring was not supplied with the source data.