Codex Cli
Monthly
Arbitrary code execution in OpenAI Codex CLI (Windows, macOS, Linux) and Codex Desktop (Windows, macOS) allows an attacker who can deliver a crafted repository archive to run code with the victim user's full privileges when Codex automatically collects Git repository metadata. The root cause is that Codex's Git metadata collection path did not suppress the repository-local core.fsmonitor configuration, enabling a malicious .git/config to direct Git to invoke an attacker-supplied filesystem-monitor helper outside Codex's command sandbox and without any user-approval prompt. OpenAI has issued a source-level fix via PR #22652 adding -c core.fsmonitor=false to the relevant Git invocations; no public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis.
OpenAI Codex CLI and Codex Desktop's PowerShell command-safety parser failed to recognize PowerShell's stop-parsing token (--%), misclassifying file-writing Git commands embedded after that token as safe and executing them without user approval. An attacker who tricks a developer into opening a crafted repository can cause Codex to silently write an attacker-controlled configuration; when Codex subsequently loads that configuration, it launches an attacker-designated MCP server and executes arbitrary code under the user's account. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis (EPSS 0.16%, 6th percentile), and the default filesystem sandbox on macOS and Linux can limit the damage radius by preventing writes outside permitted directories.
Arbitrary code execution in OpenAI Codex CLI (Windows, macOS, Linux) and Codex Desktop (Windows, macOS) allows an attacker who can deliver a crafted repository archive to run code with the victim user's full privileges when Codex automatically collects Git repository metadata. The root cause is that Codex's Git metadata collection path did not suppress the repository-local core.fsmonitor configuration, enabling a malicious .git/config to direct Git to invoke an attacker-supplied filesystem-monitor helper outside Codex's command sandbox and without any user-approval prompt. OpenAI has issued a source-level fix via PR #22652 adding -c core.fsmonitor=false to the relevant Git invocations; no public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis.
OpenAI Codex CLI and Codex Desktop's PowerShell command-safety parser failed to recognize PowerShell's stop-parsing token (--%), misclassifying file-writing Git commands embedded after that token as safe and executing them without user approval. An attacker who tricks a developer into opening a crafted repository can cause Codex to silently write an attacker-controlled configuration; when Codex subsequently loads that configuration, it launches an attacker-designated MCP server and executes arbitrary code under the user's account. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis (EPSS 0.16%, 6th percentile), and the default filesystem sandbox on macOS and Linux can limit the damage radius by preventing writes outside permitted directories.