Cocos
Monthly
Ultraviolet CoCoS through version 0.8.2 contains a session-misbinding flaw in the intra-handshake attested TLS (aTLS) verification path for Intel TDX: the verifier fails to copy the expected current-session freshness value into the TDX quote-body policy before quote validation, so any structurally valid TDX QuoteV4 Evidence is accepted without checking that its REPORT_DATA field matches the reportData expected for that session. An unauthenticated remote counterparty (CVSS vector AV:N/PR:N) that can supply or relay such a quote - acting as the attesting party or replaying a previously captured or foreign quote - can therefore cause a relying party to release application data bound to an unintended attestation context, giving high confidentiality and integrity impact. No public exploit code and no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation were identified at time of analysis, and the vendor's 9.1 score (AV:N/AC:L) slightly overstates ease of exploitation versus our assessed CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N, since a valid TDX quote and use of the affected TDX aTLS branch are prerequisites. The issue is fixed in version 0.9.0.
An attestation-freshness and origin-validation failure in the aTLS AMD SEV-SNP verification path of Cocos AI (Ultraviolet) affects versions up to and including 0.8.2: when a relying party invokes the intra-handshake verification path with no expected reportData value (nil, empty, or omitted), the SEV-SNP policy ReportData is left unset and the verifier will accept unrelated or stale Evidence that is not bound to the current TLS connection. An attacker who possesses a valid but foreign or replayed SEV-SNP attestation blob can therefore induce a trusting party to accept an unintended attestation context, undermining the core trust guarantee of the confidential-computing platform and potentially enabling both integrity and confidentiality compromise in any workflow where aTLS output drives a trust or authorization decision. Exploitation is unauthenticated at the network layer (CVSS PR:N) but constrained by high attack complexity and specific prerequisites - the caller must omit the expected reportData, and only SEV-SNP aTLS deployments up to 0.8.2 are exposed; no public exploit code or confirmed active exploitation has been identified at time of analysis. The issue is fixed in version 0.9.0.
Ultraviolet CoCoS through version 0.8.2 contains a session-misbinding flaw in the intra-handshake attested TLS (aTLS) verification path for Intel TDX: the verifier fails to copy the expected current-session freshness value into the TDX quote-body policy before quote validation, so any structurally valid TDX QuoteV4 Evidence is accepted without checking that its REPORT_DATA field matches the reportData expected for that session. An unauthenticated remote counterparty (CVSS vector AV:N/PR:N) that can supply or relay such a quote - acting as the attesting party or replaying a previously captured or foreign quote - can therefore cause a relying party to release application data bound to an unintended attestation context, giving high confidentiality and integrity impact. No public exploit code and no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation were identified at time of analysis, and the vendor's 9.1 score (AV:N/AC:L) slightly overstates ease of exploitation versus our assessed CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N, since a valid TDX quote and use of the affected TDX aTLS branch are prerequisites. The issue is fixed in version 0.9.0.
An attestation-freshness and origin-validation failure in the aTLS AMD SEV-SNP verification path of Cocos AI (Ultraviolet) affects versions up to and including 0.8.2: when a relying party invokes the intra-handshake verification path with no expected reportData value (nil, empty, or omitted), the SEV-SNP policy ReportData is left unset and the verifier will accept unrelated or stale Evidence that is not bound to the current TLS connection. An attacker who possesses a valid but foreign or replayed SEV-SNP attestation blob can therefore induce a trusting party to accept an unintended attestation context, undermining the core trust guarantee of the confidential-computing platform and potentially enabling both integrity and confidentiality compromise in any workflow where aTLS output drives a trust or authorization decision. Exploitation is unauthenticated at the network layer (CVSS PR:N) but constrained by high attack complexity and specific prerequisites - the caller must omit the expected reportData, and only SEV-SNP aTLS deployments up to 0.8.2 are exposed; no public exploit code or confirmed active exploitation has been identified at time of analysis. The issue is fixed in version 0.9.0.