Builder Io Sdk Svelte
Monthly
Prototype pollution in Builder.io Gen2 SDKs at versions ≤5.2.11 (React, Vue, Svelte, Solid) and ≤0.25.13 (Qwik, Angular, React Next.js) lets an attacker who can supply a malicious content block - for example an authenticated content editor or author with write access to a Builder.io space - inject binding keys containing __proto__, prototype, or constructor paths that the deep-set helper processes during block rendering without validation. The result is pollution of Object.prototype with high integrity impact (VI:H) and limited confidentiality/availability impact (C:L/A:L): every object created later in the same process inherits the tainted properties, so in multi-tenant or shared SSR/rendering deployments one tenant's crafted content can contaminate other tenants' renders. Exploitation requires a low-privileged position (PR:L, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L), and single-tenant sites that render only trusted first-party content have substantially reduced practical exposure; no public exploit identified at time of analysis and the issue is not listed in CISA KEV, making this a genuine but conditional risk rather than a top-tier emergency.
Prototype pollution in the unflatten helper of Builder.io Gen2 SDKs (the @builder.io/sdk-react, sdk-vue, sdk-svelte and sdk-solid packages at or below 5.2.11, and sdk-angular, sdk-react-nextjs and sdk-qwik at or below 0.25.13) lets unauthenticated remote attackers poison Object.prototype in a victim's browser by luring the victim into opening a crafted preview link whose builder.userAttributes query parameters carry __proto__ or prototype segments. Exploitation is not automatable against a passive server - it hinges on user interaction (UI:P), because the SDK must actually be running in the victim's browser when the malicious URL is processed, and real harm (DOM XSS, client-side logic tampering, denial of service) only materializes if downstream application code reads the polluted inherited properties. No CISA KEV entry and no public exploit code were identified at time of analysis, and the independent assessment rates real-world risk as moderate-to-low.
Prototype pollution in Builder.io Gen2 SDKs at versions ≤5.2.11 (React, Vue, Svelte, Solid) and ≤0.25.13 (Qwik, Angular, React Next.js) lets an attacker who can supply a malicious content block - for example an authenticated content editor or author with write access to a Builder.io space - inject binding keys containing __proto__, prototype, or constructor paths that the deep-set helper processes during block rendering without validation. The result is pollution of Object.prototype with high integrity impact (VI:H) and limited confidentiality/availability impact (C:L/A:L): every object created later in the same process inherits the tainted properties, so in multi-tenant or shared SSR/rendering deployments one tenant's crafted content can contaminate other tenants' renders. Exploitation requires a low-privileged position (PR:L, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L), and single-tenant sites that render only trusted first-party content have substantially reduced practical exposure; no public exploit identified at time of analysis and the issue is not listed in CISA KEV, making this a genuine but conditional risk rather than a top-tier emergency.
Prototype pollution in the unflatten helper of Builder.io Gen2 SDKs (the @builder.io/sdk-react, sdk-vue, sdk-svelte and sdk-solid packages at or below 5.2.11, and sdk-angular, sdk-react-nextjs and sdk-qwik at or below 0.25.13) lets unauthenticated remote attackers poison Object.prototype in a victim's browser by luring the victim into opening a crafted preview link whose builder.userAttributes query parameters carry __proto__ or prototype segments. Exploitation is not automatable against a passive server - it hinges on user interaction (UI:P), because the SDK must actually be running in the victim's browser when the malicious URL is processed, and real harm (DOM XSS, client-side logic tampering, denial of service) only materializes if downstream application code reads the polluted inherited properties. No CISA KEV entry and no public exploit code were identified at time of analysis, and the independent assessment rates real-world risk as moderate-to-low.