Bisheng
Monthly
Unauthenticated SSRF in DataElement bisheng through 2.6.0-fix2 exposes internal network services and cloud metadata endpoints to any internet-accessible attacker. The POST /api/v1/workflow/report/callback endpoint applies no authentication, no URL scheme restrictions, and no host filtering, allowing arbitrary server-side HTTP requests whose responses are retrievable from object storage via caller-controlled object names - enabling cloud credential theft (e.g., AWS IMDSv1 role keys) and internal network enumeration. No public exploit code has been identified and this CVE is not in CISA KEV at time of analysis.
Remote code execution in BISHENG's workflow engine (versions before 2.6.0) allows any authenticated user to submit crafted Code node definitions to the POST /api/v1/workflow/run_once endpoint, where they are evaluated via Python's exec() built-in without sandboxing or process isolation. Successful exploitation grants full server-side code execution with access to the host filesystem, stored credentials, and internal network resources reachable from the BISHENG backend process. No public exploit or CISA KEV listing has been identified at time of analysis, but the low-complexity, authenticated network attack path represents a critical risk especially in multi-tenant or shared-access deployments.
Unauthenticated SSRF in DataElement bisheng through 2.6.0-fix2 exposes internal network services and cloud metadata endpoints to any internet-accessible attacker. The POST /api/v1/workflow/report/callback endpoint applies no authentication, no URL scheme restrictions, and no host filtering, allowing arbitrary server-side HTTP requests whose responses are retrievable from object storage via caller-controlled object names - enabling cloud credential theft (e.g., AWS IMDSv1 role keys) and internal network enumeration. No public exploit code has been identified and this CVE is not in CISA KEV at time of analysis.
Remote code execution in BISHENG's workflow engine (versions before 2.6.0) allows any authenticated user to submit crafted Code node definitions to the POST /api/v1/workflow/run_once endpoint, where they are evaluated via Python's exec() built-in without sandboxing or process isolation. Successful exploitation grants full server-side code execution with access to the host filesystem, stored credentials, and internal network resources reachable from the BISHENG backend process. No public exploit or CISA KEV listing has been identified at time of analysis, but the low-complexity, authenticated network attack path represents a critical risk especially in multi-tenant or shared-access deployments.