Attested Tls Poc
Monthly
Relay-based impersonation in the CCC-Attestation attested-tls-poc reference implementation (all versions through commit 731ca82) lets an attacker who holds an extracted attested-TLS private key forward a relying party's attestation nonce to a genuine attester and replay the returned, valid Evidence on the attacker's own connection, thereby masquerading as the attested workload and intercepting data meant for it. The root problem is that early attestation Evidence is never cryptographically bound to the TLS connection, so possession of the key plus a position on the relay path is sufficient; CVSS 4.0 scores this 9.1 with AC:H, AT:P and PR:N, meaning no credentials are needed but attack requirements (key control, relay placement) are present. Publicly available exploit code exists in the form of the published ProVerif formal models and relay-attack artifacts, while no CISA KEV entry indicates confirmed active exploitation.
Relay-based impersonation in the CCC-Attestation attested-tls-poc reference implementation (all versions through commit 731ca82) lets an attacker who holds an extracted attested-TLS private key forward a relying party's attestation nonce to a genuine attester and replay the returned, valid Evidence on the attacker's own connection, thereby masquerading as the attested workload and intercepting data meant for it. The root problem is that early attestation Evidence is never cryptographically bound to the TLS connection, so possession of the key plus a position on the relay path is sufficient; CVSS 4.0 scores this 9.1 with AC:H, AT:P and PR:N, meaning no credentials are needed but attack requirements (key control, relay placement) are present. Publicly available exploit code exists in the form of the published ProVerif formal models and relay-attack artifacts, while no CISA KEV entry indicates confirmed active exploitation.