Ash Typescript
Monthly
Unauthenticated atom table exhaustion in ash_typescript 0.1.0-0.17.x allows any network attacker to crash the entire Erlang/BEAM node by submitting RPC requests with attacker-controlled field names. The library's `convert_to_field_atom/2` function calls `String.to_atom/1` on client-supplied strings without validation, minting permanent, non-garbage-collected atoms until the VM hits its table limit and aborts. Additionally, field names exceeding 255 characters trigger an uncaught `SystemLimitError`. No public exploit is identified at time of analysis, but exploitation is trivial given no authentication or special configuration is required.
Field policy enforcement in ash_typescript RPC serialization is bypassed by a missing pattern-match clause, allowing unauthenticated remote callers to receive the real values of attributes that Ash field policies explicitly denied. Any action returning an embedded resource through the RPC layer exposes policy-protected fields - including sensitive PII such as SSNs, as demonstrated in the patch test suite - inside the serialized JSON response. Affects ash_typescript 0.11.0 through 0.17.x; no public exploit code exists at time of analysis, but the attack path is fully described in the vendor advisory and the two-line fix diff.
Unauthenticated BEAM atom table exhaustion in ash_typescript 0.11.0-0.17.x allows a remote attacker to abort the Erlang VM and take down the entire application node by sending RPC requests carrying many distinct, unrecognized field names targeting a typed struct field selector. The root cause is `resolve_typed_struct_field/2` calling `String.to_atom/1` on unresolvable client input before any field-existence validation, permanently minting atoms that the BEAM runtime never reclaims. A vendor-released patch is available in 0.18.0; no public exploit code or CISA KEV listing exists at time of analysis.
Open redirect in ash_typescript's TypeScript client code generator allows an attacker who controls a path-parameter value to cause a generated client to forward its request - including any credentials configured in TypedControllerConfig - to an attacker-controlled host. Affected are applications using ash_typescript 0.15.0 through 0.17.x that expose generated TypeScript clients where path parameters are user-influenced. No public exploit or CISA KEV listing is present, and the EPSS signal is correspondingly low given the niche footprint of the library.
Sensitive application data leaks from HTTP 500 responses in ash_typescript versions 0.15.0 through 0.17.x due to an ungated code path that serializes handler return values verbatim using Elixir's inspect/2. Any unauthenticated caller who can trigger a typed-controller route whose handler falls through with a non-conn term - such as {:error, %User{}} - receives the full Elixir struct inspection, potentially including hashed passwords, session tokens, and tenant identifiers, in the JSON error body. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, but the disclosure is trivially reproducible with a standard HTTP client given the right application-layer condition.
Constraint bypass in ash_typescript typed-controller routes allows remote attackers to submit argument values outside declared allowlists or bounds by exploiting a missing validation step in the Ash type pipeline. Affected versions 0.15.0 through 0.17.x call Ash.Type.cast_input/3 but never invoke Ash.Type.apply_constraints/3, leaving constraints such as one_of, max_length, min, max, and match silently unenforced at runtime. Where these constraints gate role membership, status transitions, or other security-relevant decisions in the route handler, the bypass enables privilege escalation or state-machine abuse; a vendor-released patch is available in 0.18.0. No public exploit identified at time of analysis.
Sensitive internal error data - including runtime secrets potentially carried in Ash error vars fields - leaks to unauthenticated network clients in ash_typescript 0.8.0 through 0.17.x when a configured error handler raises a FunctionClauseError on an unmatched error shape. The rescue clause in apply_error_handler/3 was intended as a safety net but fell back to returning the original, unredacted error map rather than a safe generic response, inverting the intended suppress-on-failure semantics. No public exploit code has been identified and there is no CISA KEV listing; a patched release (0.18.0) is available from the Ash Project.
Unauthenticated atom table exhaustion in ash_typescript 0.1.0-0.17.x allows any network attacker to crash the entire Erlang/BEAM node by submitting RPC requests with attacker-controlled field names. The library's `convert_to_field_atom/2` function calls `String.to_atom/1` on client-supplied strings without validation, minting permanent, non-garbage-collected atoms until the VM hits its table limit and aborts. Additionally, field names exceeding 255 characters trigger an uncaught `SystemLimitError`. No public exploit is identified at time of analysis, but exploitation is trivial given no authentication or special configuration is required.
Field policy enforcement in ash_typescript RPC serialization is bypassed by a missing pattern-match clause, allowing unauthenticated remote callers to receive the real values of attributes that Ash field policies explicitly denied. Any action returning an embedded resource through the RPC layer exposes policy-protected fields - including sensitive PII such as SSNs, as demonstrated in the patch test suite - inside the serialized JSON response. Affects ash_typescript 0.11.0 through 0.17.x; no public exploit code exists at time of analysis, but the attack path is fully described in the vendor advisory and the two-line fix diff.
Unauthenticated BEAM atom table exhaustion in ash_typescript 0.11.0-0.17.x allows a remote attacker to abort the Erlang VM and take down the entire application node by sending RPC requests carrying many distinct, unrecognized field names targeting a typed struct field selector. The root cause is `resolve_typed_struct_field/2` calling `String.to_atom/1` on unresolvable client input before any field-existence validation, permanently minting atoms that the BEAM runtime never reclaims. A vendor-released patch is available in 0.18.0; no public exploit code or CISA KEV listing exists at time of analysis.
Open redirect in ash_typescript's TypeScript client code generator allows an attacker who controls a path-parameter value to cause a generated client to forward its request - including any credentials configured in TypedControllerConfig - to an attacker-controlled host. Affected are applications using ash_typescript 0.15.0 through 0.17.x that expose generated TypeScript clients where path parameters are user-influenced. No public exploit or CISA KEV listing is present, and the EPSS signal is correspondingly low given the niche footprint of the library.
Sensitive application data leaks from HTTP 500 responses in ash_typescript versions 0.15.0 through 0.17.x due to an ungated code path that serializes handler return values verbatim using Elixir's inspect/2. Any unauthenticated caller who can trigger a typed-controller route whose handler falls through with a non-conn term - such as {:error, %User{}} - receives the full Elixir struct inspection, potentially including hashed passwords, session tokens, and tenant identifiers, in the JSON error body. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, but the disclosure is trivially reproducible with a standard HTTP client given the right application-layer condition.
Constraint bypass in ash_typescript typed-controller routes allows remote attackers to submit argument values outside declared allowlists or bounds by exploiting a missing validation step in the Ash type pipeline. Affected versions 0.15.0 through 0.17.x call Ash.Type.cast_input/3 but never invoke Ash.Type.apply_constraints/3, leaving constraints such as one_of, max_length, min, max, and match silently unenforced at runtime. Where these constraints gate role membership, status transitions, or other security-relevant decisions in the route handler, the bypass enables privilege escalation or state-machine abuse; a vendor-released patch is available in 0.18.0. No public exploit identified at time of analysis.
Sensitive internal error data - including runtime secrets potentially carried in Ash error vars fields - leaks to unauthenticated network clients in ash_typescript 0.8.0 through 0.17.x when a configured error handler raises a FunctionClauseError on an unmatched error shape. The rescue clause in apply_error_handler/3 was intended as a safety net but fell back to returning the original, unredacted error map rather than a safe generic response, inverting the intended suppress-on-failure semantics. No public exploit code has been identified and there is no CISA KEV listing; a patched release (0.18.0) is available from the Ash Project.