Arcadedb Server
Monthly
Authenticated users holding only read-only (reader) privileges on an ArcadeDB database can escalate to arbitrary JVM scripting by POSTing a {"language":"js"} command to /api/v1/command/{database}, because the polyglot query engine never applies the database-administrator authorization check enforced on the SQL/Cypher paths. A cooperating sandbox flaw lets those scripts reflect from the bound database object through database.getClass().getClassLoader().loadClass to classes outside the allowedPackages whitelist, allowing an attacker to read arbitrary host files such as /etc/passwd and configuration files outside the database scope. Process creation remains blocked, so OS command execution is not confirmed; exploitation needs valid credentials and no user interaction, the flaw is fixed in ArcadeDB 26.7.1, and no public exploit code or CISA KEV entry was identified at time of analysis.
Authenticated users holding only read-only (reader) privileges on an ArcadeDB database can escalate to arbitrary JVM scripting by POSTing a {"language":"js"} command to /api/v1/command/{database}, because the polyglot query engine never applies the database-administrator authorization check enforced on the SQL/Cypher paths. A cooperating sandbox flaw lets those scripts reflect from the bound database object through database.getClass().getClassLoader().loadClass to classes outside the allowedPackages whitelist, allowing an attacker to read arbitrary host files such as /etc/passwd and configuration files outside the database scope. Process creation remains blocked, so OS command execution is not confirmed; exploitation needs valid credentials and no user interaction, the flaw is fixed in ArcadeDB 26.7.1, and no public exploit code or CISA KEV entry was identified at time of analysis.