Alsa Lib
Monthly
Memory corruption in the Advanced Linux Sound Architecture (ALSA) user-space library (alsa-lib) before 1.2.16.1 allows local attackers to crash audio-dependent processes by feeding maliciously crafted configuration text to parse_def() in src/conf.c. The flaw is a double-free reachable through nested compound or array config blocks, leading to a NULL-pointer write or invalid read; publicly available exploit code exists (reported by VulnCheck), but the issue is not on the CISA KEV list.
Stack buffer overflow in alsa-lib through 1.2.16.1 allows local low-privilege attackers to crash any process consuming ALSA control-element identifiers by supplying a name= field of 64 or more characters via saved state files or command-line arguments. The off-by-one condition in __snd_ctl_ascii_elem_id_parse() (ctlparse.c:216-241) writes one byte past a 64-byte stack buffer, corrupting adjacent stack memory and causing process termination. No public exploit is identified at time of analysis; modern stack-canary mitigations further limit exploitation beyond DoS.
Memory corruption in the Advanced Linux Sound Architecture (ALSA) user-space library (alsa-lib) before 1.2.16.1 allows local attackers to crash audio-dependent processes by feeding maliciously crafted configuration text to parse_def() in src/conf.c. The flaw is a double-free reachable through nested compound or array config blocks, leading to a NULL-pointer write or invalid read; publicly available exploit code exists (reported by VulnCheck), but the issue is not on the CISA KEV list.
Stack buffer overflow in alsa-lib through 1.2.16.1 allows local low-privilege attackers to crash any process consuming ALSA control-element identifiers by supplying a name= field of 64 or more characters via saved state files or command-line arguments. The off-by-one condition in __snd_ctl_ascii_elem_id_parse() (ctlparse.c:216-241) writes one byte past a 64-byte stack buffer, corrupting adjacent stack memory and causing process termination. No public exploit is identified at time of analysis; modern stack-canary mitigations further limit exploitation beyond DoS.