Abp And Aes
Monthly
ASUSTOR Backup Plan (ABP) and EZSync (AES) background services run as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM and expose a file-based IPC channel whose AES encryption key is readable by standard users and recoverable via Windows DPAPI, allowing any authenticated local account to forge valid service requests. The services further fail to verify the identity of the requesting process and validate filesystem paths using an insufficient substring check, enabling directory traversal sequences to bypass path restrictions. A local attacker can chain these weaknesses to perform arbitrary file reads and writes as SYSTEM, achieving full local privilege escalation. No public exploit code or active exploitation (CISA KEV) has been identified at time of analysis.
ASUSTOR Backup Plan (ABP) and EZSync (AES) background services run as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM and expose a file-based IPC channel whose AES encryption key is readable by standard users and recoverable via Windows DPAPI, allowing any authenticated local account to forge valid service requests. The services further fail to verify the identity of the requesting process and validate filesystem paths using an insufficient substring check, enabling directory traversal sequences to bypass path restrictions. A local attacker can chain these weaknesses to perform arbitrary file reads and writes as SYSTEM, achieving full local privilege escalation. No public exploit code or active exploitation (CISA KEV) has been identified at time of analysis.