Setracker2 Android App Weak Cryptography and Auth Flaws

Authentication bypass in the Setracker2 Android companion app (com.tgelec.setracker) versions 3.1.5 and prior lets an attacker who possesses a user's stored password hash authenticate directly to the backend and gain full account access. Because the backend treats the password hash itself as the secret credential, the hash is password-equivalent and does not need to be cracked back to plaintext. No public exploit identified at time of analysis; the issue was disclosed through CISA/ICS-CERT (advisory VA-26-176-01) and carries a high CVSS 4.0 score of 9.2.

Cleartext recovery of Setracker2 GPS-watch traffic is possible because the com.tgelec.setracker Android companion app (versions 3.1.5 and prior) protects watch-to-backend requests with static, hardcoded AES keys and initialization vectors. Any attacker who can observe the encrypted traffic - or who extracts the keys from the freely distributed APK - can decrypt communications between the wearable tracker and its cloud backend, exposing location and account data of the (frequently child) wearers. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, and the issue is not listed in CISA KEV.

Session hijacking in the Setracker2 Android companion app (com.tgelec.setracker) version 3.1.5 and earlier stems from the use of MD5 to generate the request signature that authenticates traffic between the mobile client and the backend REST API. Because MD5 is cryptographically broken, an attacker who can observe a signed request may reverse the signature to recover the embedded session ID and then impersonate the legitimate user, issuing authenticated API calls against the kids'/GPS-tracker backend. Reported by CISA ICS-CERT (DHS) and tracked in a CSAF advisory; no public exploit identified at time of analysis and it is not listed in CISA KEV.

Unauthorized device enrollment in the Setracker2 Android companion app (com.tgelec.setracker) versions 3.1.5 and prior lets remote attackers hijack other users' GPS smartwatches by guessing their registration ID. The registration ID is predictably derived from the device IMEI, and the enrollment workflow performs no secondary authentication before binding a watch to an account, so an attacker who learns or calculates the ID can take over the target's tracker. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, and the issue carries a CVSS 4.0 base score of 8.3 with high confidentiality impact, reflecting exposure of a child's or wearer's location data.