iFlytek astron-agent SQLi and SSRF Vulnerabilities

SQL injection in the console component of iFlytek astron-agent (versions up to and including 1.0.7) lets an authenticated low-privilege user inject arbitrary SQL via the `sortDirection` parameter of the getBotList API, which is concatenated directly into the ORDER BY clause of ChatBotMarketMapper.xml. Because the vulnerable ORDER BY sink cannot return query results to the caller, exploitation is blind (time- or boolean-based), so an attacker with a valid console account and network access to the endpoint could progressively extract backend data - the independent assessment rates confidentiality impact as high (CVSS:3.1 C:H, PR:L, AV:N) with no integrity or availability effect. No public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis, the issue is not listed in CISA KEV, and EPSS data was not supplied; the vendor addressed it in release reward-1575 by whitelisting the sort direction.

Server-side request forgery (SSRF) in iFlytek astron-agent through version 1.0.6 lets an authenticated console user steer server-side HTTP requests to internal or otherwise restricted destinations by supplying a crafted endPoint argument to the debugToolV2 API, which reaches UrlCheckTool.checkUrl. The weakness is a redirect-handling gap: the pre-patch validator followed only a single 301/302/303 hop and ignored 307/308, so a URL that passes the initial blacklist/whitelist check can still bounce the request to an internal target; the vendor fixed this in release reward-1575 with a bounded 5-hop chain that revalidates every hop and detects loops. Impact is limited (CVSS 4.0 score 5.3; independent assessment CVSS 3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N), requiring valid console credentials, and no public exploit identified at time of analysis.