Kong Gateway EUVD-2026-97300

Exploitation requires the target to run Kong Gateway in Hybrid Mode (Control Plane / Data Plane split) - standalone/DB-less deployments are not in the described attack path. The attacker must have adjacent network access to the Control Plane's clustering port (normally an internal, non-internet-facing channel between CP and DP nodes) AND possess a valid clustering client certificate and private key used for mTLS authentication. These limiting factors - Hybrid Mode only, internal clustering port reachability, and legitimate mTLS credentials (reflected as PR:L and AT:P) - substantially narrow realistic exploitation to compromised Data Plane nodes or insiders with stolen cluster credentials.

Kong rates this CVSS 4.0 7.5 (High) with vector AV:A/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N and total VC:H/VI:H/VA:H impact, reflecting a SQL injection that yields unauthorized read/write access to the Control Plane's backing database. Several signals temper the raw severity: the attack vector is Adjacent (AV:A), not Network, because exploitation targets the internal clustering port rather than an internet-facing API; PR:L plus AT:P encode the hard requirement for a valid clustering client certificate and key, meaning the attacker must already possess legitimately issued (or stolen) mTLS credentials and reach the CP's clustering channel. No EPSS score, CISA KEV listing, or public proof-of-concept was provided in the input, so there is no public exploit identified at time of analysis and no evidence of active exploitation. Net: this is a genuine high-impact bug for Hybrid Mode operators, but realistic exploitation is gated behind credential possession and adjacent network access, making it a targeted-insider/compromised-data-plane risk rather than a mass-exploitable internet-facing one. Note the vendor supplies a 4.0 vector only; no CVSS 3.1 vector was provided, so cross-version comparison relies on an inferred 3.1 mapping.

An attacker who holds a valid Kong clustering client certificate and key (e.g., a compromised Data Plane node or stolen credential) establishes a connection to the Control Plane's clustering port in Hybrid Mode and sends specially crafted RPC requests. The malicious RPC payload is passed unsanitized into the CP's clustering database logic, triggering SQL injection that allows the attacker to read or tamper with the configuration/credential database. No public proof-of-concept was referenced in the available data.