Raven EUVD-2026-96896

Requires a valid authenticated account on the target Raven instance at any privilege level (PR:L) - the attacker need not be a member of the targeted workspace. The attacker must know or guess predictable channel IDs, and the targeted channels must be Public (message history) or Open/Public (file metadata). Limiting factors: only Raven versions 2.0.0 through 3.0.0 exposing the legacy get_messages_with_dates and get_all_files_shared_in_channel endpoints are affected; private/non-public channels are not disclosed; impact is read-only confidentiality of message history and file metadata with no integrity or availability effect; and valid credentials are mandatory (no unauthenticated access).

This is a genuinely medium/low-priority issue, not a high-severity one. The provided CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N) scores 5.3 and is consistent with the description: exploitation is network-reachable and low-complexity but requires an authenticated low-privilege account (PR:L), and impact is confined to confidentiality of limited data (VC:L only; VI:N/VA:N). No EPSS score was provided. There is no CISA KEV listing and no explicit POC flag in the input, so this is no public exploit identified at time of analysis - although a detailed technical write-up (hackmd) and a VulnCheck advisory exist that disclose the exact vulnerable methods and code locations, which lowers the bar for weaponization. No SSVC decision data was supplied. Net: a real but bounded cross-workspace information-disclosure bug affecting only Public channel history and Open/Public file metadata, requiring valid credentials and knowledge or guessing of predictable channel IDs - a moderate confidentiality concern rather than an urgent, broadly-exploitable priority.

An attacker holding any low-privilege authenticated account on a multi-workspace Raven deployment calls the legacy get_messages_with_dates or get_all_files_shared_in_channel API methods, supplying guessed or enumerated predictable channel IDs belonging to other workspaces. Because these legacy endpoints skip the workspace membership check, the attacker reads Public channel message history and Open/Public channel file metadata they were never authorized to see. No public exploit is identified at time of analysis, but a public technical write-up documents the exact methods and code paths.