Reachy Mini OS EUVD-2026-90198

Requires the attacker to already be running as the pollen daemon user (uid 1000) on a Reachy Mini Wireless device whose OS image was built from reachy-mini-os prior to v0.2.4 - specifically an image containing the /etc/sudoers.d entry granting 'pollen ALL=(root) NOPASSWD:' on /usr/bin/systemctl with no subcommand/argument restriction. No authentication prompt, TTY, or user interaction is needed once pollen access is held. Limiting factors: exploitation is strictly local (attacker must first reach the pollen account, e.g., via a compromised reachy daemon), affects only unpatched images, and is fully neutralized on v0.2.4+ where each sudo command is pinned to fixed arguments. Note the patch also depends on the /bluetooth/commands/*.sh scripts remaining root-owned and non-pollen-writable.

The CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H = 7.8 HIGH) is well-calibrated and I agree with it: this is a local privilege escalation requiring an existing foothold as the low-privileged pollen user (uid 1000), with no user interaction and trivial complexity. The commit diff confirms the root cause - a blanket 'pollen ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/systemctl' with no argument restriction, which the maintainers themselves describe as 'a trivial local root escalation via systemctl link of an attacker-controlled unit.' No EPSS score, KEV listing, or public PoC is provided in the input, so exploitation status is 'no public exploit identified at time of analysis'; however, the description explicitly states root is obtainable 'in three commands, with no additional vulnerability required,' meaning weaponization is near-trivial for anyone who reads the advisory even absent packaged exploit code. The gating factor is reachability: an attacker must already execute code as pollen, which caps real-world urgency. There is no signal conflict - the network-vs-local question does not arise since both the vector (AV:L) and description agree this is strictly local. This is a genuine but bounded priority: critical impact if the pollen account is reachable (e.g., via a networked daemon RCE), low urgency on isolated devices.

An attacker who has gained code execution as the pollen daemon user - for example by compromising one of the reachy network-facing daemons that run under that account - writes an attacker-controlled systemd unit whose ExecStart runs as root, then uses the unrestricted passwordless 'sudo systemctl link' / 'enable --now' primitive to load and start it, yielding a root shell. No public exploit is packaged, but the vendor advisory notes full root is reachable in three commands with no user interaction and no second vulnerability.