EUVD-2026-89779
GHSA-cp25-qw94-53fj
Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessGain local low-privileged access
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DeliveryConnect to client IPC named pipe
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ExploitSupply forged client SID
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ExecutionBypass SID validation
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PersistSYSTEM service deletes arbitrary file
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ImpactCorruption/DoS or privilege escalation
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A01:2025 - Broken Access Control
ASVS 5.0
V5 - File Handling Relative path traversal prevention
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| Exploitation Conditions | Requires the Cato Networks SDP Client for Windows (version before 6.12.6) installed and running its privileged service, plus an authenticated local user (PR:L) able to reach the client's local IPC named pipe. Exploitation is purely local (AV:L) - there is no remote or network-facing path and no user interaction is needed. The limiting factors are: attacker must already have code execution or interactive access on the endpoint at low privilege, and the target host must run the affected Cato client, which confines exposure to Cato SASE customers' managed Windows fleets. |
| Impact | This is a genuine but bounded-scope local privilege escalation primitive rather than a remotely-exploitable emergency. The vendor CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N) confirms exploitation requires an already-authenticated local user with low privileges on a Windows endpoint running the Cato SDP client - there is no network attack surface. The high 8.5 score is driven by the SYSTEM-level integrity/availability impact: a low-privileged user can coerce a SYSTEM service into deleting arbitrary files, a well-understood building block for local privilege escalation and denial of service. Signals are consistent with a moderate-priority, defense-in-depth fix: no CISA KEV listing, no EPSS score provided, and no public POC identified in the single vendor reference. There is no active-exploitation evidence, so this is a patch-in-normal-cycle item, not a fire-drill. Note a data conflict: the vendor rates confidentiality as VC:H, but arbitrary file DELETION does not directly disclose data - the realistic impact is integrity/availability (and escalation to SYSTEM), so the confidentiality rating appears inflated. Also note the 'Information Disclosure' tag contradicts the described file-deletion behavior. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | A local low-privileged user (or malware running in that user's context) on a Windows host with the Cato SDP client connects to the client's local IPC named pipe and supplies a forged/attacker-controlled SID that the service fails to validate. The service, running as SYSTEM, is then tricked into deleting an attacker-specified arbitrary file, which can be leveraged to corrupt or remove protected files and pivot toward full SYSTEM privilege escalation. No public exploit code was identified at time of analysis. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Sep 30, 2026
Improper validation of a client-supplied SID over a local IPC named pipe in the Cato Networks SDP Client for Windows (versions before 6.12.6) lets a local, low-privileged user coerce the client's SYSTEM-level service into deleting arbitrary files with SYSTEM privileges, resulting in high integrity and availability impact on the affected endpoint. Exploitation is purely local - it requires an authenticated local user (PR:L per the CVSS vectors) with the ability to reach the client's local IPC named pipe, no user interaction, and the affected client installed and running on the target Windows host; there is no remote or network-facing attack path. This is confirmed neither as actively exploited (no CISA KEV listing) nor as having public exploit code: no public exploit identified at time of analysis, and the bounded local scope makes it a genuine but non-emergency privilege-escalation and file-tampering primitive rather than a remotely exploitable critical issue.
RemediationAI
Upgrade the Cato Networks SDP Client for Windows to version 6.12.6 or later, which is the vendor-released fix documented in the advisory at https://knowledge.catonetworks.com/docs/cve-2026-10726-cve-2026-10739-impacts-windows-client-versions-lower-than-6126 (the same advisory also covers CVE-2026-10726, so a single client upgrade addresses both). Because this is a local privilege-escalation primitive, compensating controls focus on denying the precondition: restrict local interactive logon and RDP access so that only trusted administrators can obtain a session on hosts running the SDP Client, accepting the operational trade-off that help-desk and standard user workflows on those endpoints must be redesigned or brokered through a jump host; tighten named-pipe ACLs or use Windows Defender Application Control/AppLocker to prevent untrusted binaries from connecting to the client's IPC pipe, with the trade-off that overly broad pipe restrictions can break legitimate client-to-service communication and require careful staged testing; and deploy EDR detections for SYSTEM-context file deletions initiated by the SDP Client process, especially deletions outside Cato's install and program-data directories, noting that such monitoring is detective rather than preventive and generates tuning overhead. Applying full disk or file-level backups and object-level auditing on critical SYSTEM-owned paths can reduce recovery time if an attacker triggers destructive deletions, though it does not stop the primitive itself. No public exploit code was identified at time of analysis, so prioritization should be driven by the presence of the affected client version on hosts exposed to multi-user or low-privileged local access rather than by evidence of active exploitation.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in euvd
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Technical ContextAI · show details
The Cato Networks SDP (Secure Digital Perimeter) Client for Windows installs a privileged service that runs as SYSTEM and communicates with lower-privileged client components over a local IPC named pipe. Because the service trusts a client-supplied SID from those pipe messages without adequate validation, an attacker who can write to the pipe can influence a file path that the SYSTEM service subsequently acts upon. The root cause class is CWE-23 (Relative Path Traversal): traversal sequences or otherwise unvalidated path components supplied by the caller escape the intended directory, so the trusted service deletes a file outside the expected scope while operating with SYSTEM rights. The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) and the independent CVSS 3.1 assessment (AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H) agree that the attack is local, requires low privileges, needs no user interaction, and yields high integrity and availability impact on the vulnerable component; they differ only in whether the scope is treated as changed or in how confidentiality impact is counted, so the practical impact ceiling is arbitrary file deletion/integrity loss on the endpoint, not remote code execution and not credential disclosure. The affected component is identified by CPE cpe:2.3:a:cato_networks:sdp_client, a version-agnostic wildcard matching the Windows client line prior to the fixed release.
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Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Local IPC named pipe (AV:L) reachable by a low-priv user (PR:L); the SYSTEM service acting on attacker input crosses a privilege boundary (S:C); deletion yields I:H/A:H but no direct disclosure (C:N).
Primary rating from Vendor (Cato).
CVSS VectorVendor: Cato
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
Cato Networks SDP Client for Windows before 6.12.6 allows a local user to delete arbitrary files with SYSTEM privileges via improper validation of a client-supplied SID over a local IPC named pipe.
Articles & Coverage 1
Technical POC Analysis
Evidence caveat, read first: the only supplied evidence is a Packet Storm Bluesky post announcing "Cato VPN Client: Split-Tunnel and Privilege Escalation (CVE-2026-10739)" plus the CVE metadata you p…
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Latest POC
1 public PoC link from packetstorm
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Executive ViewAI
Cato Networks SDP Client for Windows (versions before 6.12.6) contains a high-severity local privilege escalation vulnerability that allows an authenticated local user to force the client's SYSTEM service to delete arbitrary files, causing data loss and service disruption on affected endpoints. No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis, and no public exploit identified at time of analysis. Leadership should prioritize identifying and mitigating affected endpoints, as this flaw can be leveraged by malicious insiders or attackers with existing local access to elevate privileges and impair critical systems.
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis. Interim mitigations include restricting local interactive logon to trusted users, monitoring named pipe access and file deletion events via EDR, enforcing least privilege for local accounts, maintaining offline backups of critical files, and disabling the Cato SDP Client on non-essential endpoints until a patch is available.
Threat Model
5 threats: Elevation of Privilege, Tampering, Denial of Service and 1 more
4-step attack chain with trust boundaries and controls
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Threat Intelligence Overview
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Vulnrichment
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
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Exploit-DB