What is the CVSS score of EUVD-2026-85184?

EUVD-2026-85184 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 8.2 (High). CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.5%.

How to fix or mitigate EUVD-2026-85184?

Within 24 hours, compile a complete inventory of desktop applications built with Pake and determine which are distributed to employees, customers, or partners; for each, inspect the generated src-tauri/capabilities/default.json for the wildcard entry "remote": { "urls": ["https://*.*"] } in the default capability and confirm whether src-tauri/tauri.conf.json sets "withGlobalTauri": true - any app where both are present is in scope. Where a build pipeline exists, immediately harden and rebuild: replace the wildcard remote URL list with an explicit allowlist of the specific trusted origins the app must load, set withGlobalTauri to false, and strip native commands the app does not need (starting with download_file and any other file-system or process-invoking handlers) from the generate_handler! registration, then re-sign and redistribute installers and force auto-update so existing installs pick up the hardened build. Where a rebuild is not immediately possible, suspend distribution of the affected installer, disable auto-update, and instruct users to run the app only against the single intended first-party origin until a hardened build is available; note that no vendor-released patch from the Pake project exists at time of analysis, so these are self-applied configuration mitigations rather than vendor fixes. Within 7 days, complete the hardened rebuild and redeployment of every in-scope application, add a CI or pre-commit check that fails any build containing a wildcard remote URL capability or withGlobalTauri enabled, verify the generated Tauri capability manifests against the intended origin allowlist, and subscribe to the Pake and Tauri project security advisories so a vendor fix can be adopted as soon as it ships. Within 30 days, re-run the inventory to catch applications created outside the tracked pipeline, pin and centrally govern Pake and Tauri template versions, require security review of generated capability and configuration files before any new desktop app is released, add monitoring or endpoint logging for unexpected download_file invocations and outbound file writes by these applications, and close out with a documented attestation that no in-scope application retains the wildcard remote capability.

Pake EUVD-2026-85184

| CVE-2026-96454 HIGH

Missing Authorization (CWE-862)

2026-09-23 JFROG

GHSA-jwcr-mx7v-qwwq

Authentication Bypass RCE Path Traversal Rust Tauri Pake

8.2

CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: JFROG

View

Attack ChainAIDerived

Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain

Recon

Victim runs Pake-generated app
Delivery

Malicious/3rd-party script loads on HTTPS page
Exploit

Call window.__TAURI__.core.invoke() from page JS
Install

Unchecked app command download_file invoked
C2

Chain path traversal (CVE-2026-82635)
Execute

Arbitrary file write to startup location
Impact

Persistent code execution

Vulnerability Assessment

Weakness	CWE CWE-862 OWASP Top 10:2025 A01:2025 - Broken Access Control ASVS 5.0 V8 - Authorization Authorization checks on every request MITRE ATT&CK 1 technique across 1 tactic: Privilege Escalation The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. Sign in to read
Exploitation Conditions	Applies to any application generated by Pake that ships the upstream defaults: the IPC capability in src-tauri/capabilities/default.json set to "remote": {"urls": ["https://."]} (accepting IPC from any HTTPS origin) AND "withGlobalTauri": true in src-tauri/tauri.conf.json (exposing window.__TAURI__.core.invoke() to ordinary page JavaScript). Exploitation requires the victim to run the Pake app and for attacker-controlled JavaScript to execute on an HTTPS page inside it (directly, or via third-party analytics/ad/compromised-CDN script the wrapped site loads). Because Tauri's ACL only validates plugin: commands, self-registered app commands like download_file are reachable without any permission entry. Full arbitrary-file-write/persistent-code-execution additionally requires chaining the path traversal tracked as CVE-2026-82635. Limiting factors: user interaction (running the app / loading the page), and it is fixed in Pake V3.17.0.
Impact	This is a genuine, structurally-rooted authorization flaw affecting every application generated by Pake, not a one-off bug. The CVSS 8.2 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N) is credible: network-reachable, low-complexity, no authentication, scope-changed because untrusted web content crosses into native app functionality. The one gating factor is UI:R - a victim must run a Pake app and load a page containing attacker script (which can be third-party analytics/ad/CDN script the wrapped site pulls in itself, lowering the practical bar). Critically, the I:H rating and the 'RCE' framing depend on chaining with the separately-tracked path-traversal CVE-2026-82635 in download_file; on its own, this CVE is an authorization bypass that hands any HTTPS origin unchecked access to app commands. No EPSS score, KEV entry, or POC is present in the input, so there is NO evidence of active exploitation - priority should be driven by the design-level exposure and the availability of a fix (V3.17.0), not by observed in-the-wild activity. Bottom line: a real, high-value issue for anyone shipping a Pake-generated app, but exploitation is targeted/conditional (requires the chain and user interaction) rather than mass-automatable against arbitrary internet hosts.
Exploit ScenarioDerived	A user runs a Pake-generated desktop app wrapping a website; a compromised CDN or malicious third-party ad/analytics script loaded by that site executes JavaScript that calls window.__TAURI__.core.invoke('download_file', ...), which Tauri's ACL never checks because it is an app command rather than a plugin command. Combined with the path traversal in CVE-2026-82635, the attacker writes a file to an arbitrary location (e.g. an autostart/startup path) to achieve persistent code execution. No public exploit is identified in the provided data, though JFROG reported the issue.

This Week Schedule remediation this week. Why: HIGH severity (CVSS 7.0-8.9).

No patch listed yet 0.5% exploitation probability (EPSS)

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AnalysisAIv1 – Sep 23, 2026

Every desktop application generated by Pake inherits two upstream template defaults that together hand native IPC functionality to untrusted web content, allowing scripts served from any HTTPS origin to invoke the application's own native commands, including download_file. The root cause is a wildcard Tauri capability ("remote": { "urls": ["https://*.*"] } in src-tauri/capabilities/default.json) paired with "withGlobalTauri": true in src-tauri/tauri.conf.json, which places window.__TAURI__.core.invoke() within reach of ordinary page JavaScript; because Tauri's access control list only validates plugin: commands and not commands registered by the application itself via generate_handler!, no permission entry is required to call them. Exploitation is unauthenticated per the assessed vector (PR:N) but requires user interaction (UI:R) - the victim must run the generated app and attacker-controlled JavaScript must execute inside it, whether directly or through third-party analytics, advertising, or a compromised CDN loaded by the wrapped site. Chained with the path traversal tracked separately as CVE-2026-82635, this escalates to arbitrary file write and persistent code execution; no public exploit identified at time of analysis, and the issue is fixed in Pake V3.17.0.

RemediationAI

Upgrade to Pake V3.17.0 (https://github.com/tw93/Pake/releases/tag/V3.17.0) and regenerate affected applications so the corrected capability and configuration defaults are inherited; vendor-released patch: Pake V3.17.0. For applications that cannot be regenerated immediately, apply the fixes directly in the generated project: edit src-tauri/capabilities/default.json to replace the "remote": { "urls": ["https://*.*"] } wildcard with the exact origin(s) of the wrapped site, which removes IPC access from arbitrary HTTPS pages but may break legitimate embedded third-party widgets that relied on the broad grant; and set "withGlobalTauri": false (or remove the key) in src-tauri/tauri.conf.json so window.__TAURI__.core.invoke() is not exposed to ordinary page JavaScript, with the trade-off that any page-level integration depending on the global object must be reworked to use the Tauri module API. Where the application bundles its own commands such as download_file, ensure they are gated by appropriate plugin permissions or application-level validation rather than relying on the ACL, since self-registered commands are not ACL-checked. Additionally, remediate the separately tracked path traversal CVE-2026-82635, which must be chained with this issue to achieve arbitrary file write and persistent code execution, so the traversal fix materially reduces the blast radius even if the IPC misconfiguration persists. Review advisory and capability documentation at https://github.com/tw93/Pake and https://v2.tauri.app/security/capabilities/ when validating the corrected configuration.

Affected VersionsENISA

Pake 0 ≤3.17.0

Affected Packages

euvd pake no fix

Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)

Affects your stack

Affects 1 package in euvd

Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.

Technical ContextAI · show details

Pake is a tool that wraps a website into a cross-platform desktop application built on Tauri, a Rust-based framework that renders a webview front end and exposes native functionality to JavaScript through an IPC bridge. Tauri's security model relies on capabilities (src-tauri/capabilities/default.json) that scope which windows, origins, and permissions may access IPC, and on an access control list enforced for plugin commands (those prefixed with plugin:). The flaw is a missing-authorization weakness (CWE-862): commands registered by the application through generate_handler! - Pake's download_file is one - are never evaluated against the ACL. Compounding this, the upstream template ships the capability with "remote": { "urls": ["https://*.*"] }, which tells Tauri to accept IPC from any HTTPS origin rather than only the specific site being wrapped, and sets "withGlobalTauri": true in src-tauri/tauri.conf.json, which exposes window.__TAURI__.core.invoke() to ordinary page JavaScript instead of keeping the API behind a module import. The result is that any JavaScript executing on any HTTPS page loaded inside a Pake application - including third-party analytics, ad, or CDN script that the wrapped site itself pulls in - holds a fully authorized path to every app command, with the ACL providing no compensating restriction. The affected component is identified by CPE cpe:2.3:a:tw93:pake:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*, and full arbitrary file write requires chaining the separate path traversal in download_file (CVE-2026-82635).

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Severity by source

Vendor (JFROG) PRIMARY 8.2 HIGH

AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N

vuln.today AI 8.2 HIGH

Any HTTPS-origin script reaches unchecked native commands (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N), UI:R since victim must run the app and load the page, S:C for web-to-native crossing, I:H realized via chained path traversal.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N

4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from Vendor (JFROG).

CVSS VectorVendor: JFROG

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

None

User Interaction

Required

Scope

Changed

Confidentiality

Low

Integrity

High

Availability

None

DescriptionCVE.org

Pake turns a website into a desktop application built on Tauri. Every application it generates inherits two settings from the upstream template, and together they hand native functionality to untrusted web content.

The first is in src-tauri/capabilities/default.json, which grants IPC access with "remote": { "urls": ["https://*.*"] }. That wildcard tells Tauri to accept IPC from any HTTPS origin, not just the site the application was built to wrap. The second is "withGlobalTauri": true in src-tauri/tauri.conf.json, which puts window.__TAURI__.core.invoke() in reach of ordinary page JavaScript.

Tauri's access control list only checks plugin commands, the ones prefixed with plugin:. Commands the application registers itself through generate_handler!, known as app commands, are never checked against the ACL. So once an origin holds IPC access, it can call every app command with nothing else standing in the way. Pake registers download_file as an app command, and it does not appear in the permissions list because it does not need to.

The practical effect is that any script running on any HTTPS page inside a Pake application can invoke the application's native commands. That includes third-party script the wrapped site loads on its own, such as analytics, advertising, or a compromised CDN. Anyone distributing their own Pake application gets the same access without asking for it. Chained with the path traversal in download_file that is tracked separately as CVE-2026-82635, this reaches arbitrary file write and persistent code execution.

Executive ViewAI

Why It Matters

Every desktop application produced by the Pake build framework inherits template defaults that let any web page loaded inside the app silently invoke that app's own native functions, including downloading files to the user's machine. Organizations that ship Pake-generated clients - internal tooling wrappers, branded web front-ends, customer-facing desktop apps - therefore have a single configuration flaw replicated across their entire desktop application portfolio, and the exposure is realized only when a user runs one of these apps and attacker-controlled content renders within it. Leadership should treat this as a framework-level supply-chain issue: remediation is not a one-off server fix but a coordinated rebuild and re-release of every affected application, with ownership sitting with the engineering teams that build and distribute them.

Business Impact: High

Compensating Controls

No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis. Interim mitigations: replace the wildcard remote URL capability ("https://*.*") in src-tauri/capabilities/default.json with an explicit allowlist of trusted first-party origins; set "withGlobalTauri": false in src-tauri/tauri.conf.json so page JavaScript cannot reach window.__TAURI__.core.invoke(); remove unnecessary native commands, especially download_file, from the generate_handler! registration; restrict the app to loading only known trusted content and block third-party analytics or remote scripts inside the webview; rebuild, re-sign, and force-update all distributed applications; disable auto-update and suspend distribution where a hardened rebuild is not yet available; and monitor endpoint telemetry for anomalous file downloads or native command activity by these apps until a vendor patch is released and applied.

Threat Intelligence Overview

EPSS Score

0.5%

Top 59% exploitable

Prevalence

Medium

Extremely popular OSS repo, but generated apps are mostly personal wrappers, not enterprise-deployed

Data Quality

6 sources

Confidence: High

EUVD

NVD

CVE.org

EPSS

Vulnrichment

GitHub

How this decision was reached

The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.

SignalValue

Severity HIGH

CISA KEV No

Public POC No

EPSS 0.5%

Patch available No

Active threat No

Deciding rule

HIGH severity (CVSS 7.0-8.9)

What every action level means

Emergency Immediate action required. Criteria: CRITICAL + in CISA KEV (actively exploited) without patch, OR CRITICAL + EPSS > 30% without patch, OR CRITICAL + active threat signals without patch.

Act Now Prioritize within 24-48h. Criteria: in KEV with patch available, OR CRITICAL + public POC, OR HIGH + EPSS > 10%, OR CRITICAL + active threat, OR any CRITICAL severity.

This Week Schedule remediation this week. Criteria: HIGH severity (CVSS 7.0-8.9). Patch within normal change window.

This Month Plan within 30 days. Criteria: MEDIUM severity (CVSS 4.0-6.9), lower exploitation probability. Include in regular patch cycle.

Monitor Track and reassess. Criteria: LOW severity (CVSS 0.1-3.9), minimal exploitation risk. No immediate action needed.