Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessIdentify exposed LangBot reset endpoint
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DeliveryObtain admin email address
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ExploitSend concurrent recovery-key guesses (24-bit space)
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ExecutionMatch key, reset admin password
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ImpactLog in as administrator, full control
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A04:2025 - Cryptographic Failures
ASVS 5.0
V11 - Cryptography Entropy requirements
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| Exploitation Conditions | Exploitation requires: (1) network reachability of the unauthenticated reset-password HTTP endpoint (AV:N/PR:N - no login needed); (2) knowledge of the administrator's registered email address, used to target the reset; and (3) the ability to send many concurrent requests to brute-force the 24-bit recovery key, since the endpoint applied no rate limiting (AT:P/AC:H reflect this attack requirement and effort). Limiting factors: the target must be running LangBot before 4.10.11 with the reset endpoint exposed, and the attacker must already know or guess the exact admin email; instances not reachable from the attacker's network, or fronted by a rate-limiting/authenticating proxy, are substantially harder to exploit. |
| Impact | The CVSS 4.0 base score of 9.2 reflects unauthenticated network reachability (AV:N/PR:N) with full compromise of the admin account (VC:H/VI:H/VA:H), tempered by AC:H and AT:P - the attack requires knowing the admin email and mounting a concurrent keyspace-exhaustion campaign rather than a single trivial request. This is a genuine account-takeover primitive, not a high-score-but-low-impact issue: 24 bits is exhaustible in practice, and the absence of rate limiting removes the usual brute-force barrier, so even a mid-sized municipal IT team should treat an exposed LangBot admin panel as urgent. Counterbalancing signals are that there is no CISA KEV listing and no public exploit identified, and exploitation still hinges on network exposure of the reset endpoint plus knowledge of the admin email, so realistic risk is highest for internet-facing deployments and lower for internal-only instances. EPSS was not provided in the input and cannot be cited. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker who knows the LangBot administrator's email address sends a flood of concurrent POST requests to the unauthenticated reset-password endpoint, each guessing a recovery key across the 24-bit space. With no rate limiting, the keyspace is exhausted, a guess matches, and the attacker resets the admin password and logs in with full control of the bot platform. No public exploit is identified at time of analysis, but the technique is straightforward to script. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Sep 13, 2026
Administrator account takeover in LangBot before 4.10.11 stems from password-recovery keys generated with only 24 bits of entropy (secrets.token_hex(3)) combined with a total absence of rate limiting on the unauthenticated reset-password endpoint. A remote attacker who knows the administrator's email address can fire concurrent requests to exhaust the ~16.7M-value keyspace and reset the admin password, seizing full control of the instance. VulnCheck reported the issue and a vendor patch exists (4.10.11); no public exploit is identified at time of analysis, and the flaw is not in CISA KEV.
RemediationAI
Upgrade to LangBot 4.10.11 or later, which contains the fix (Vendor-released patch: 4.10.11; commit https://github.com/langbot-app/LangBot/commit/267232c24f93c515d6fd3f7f81c0676066ab1ab8). The patch increases recovery-key entropy to ~40 bits, uses constant-time comparison, and adds a fixed-window quota of 5 reset attempts per 15 minutes; note that per the vendor's own comment this limiter is process-local, so multi-worker deployments must add a shared upstream limiter (e.g. reverse-proxy or gateway rate limiting on the reset endpoint) to be fully protected. If you cannot patch immediately, manually regenerate system.recovery_key in the instance configuration with a long strong random value (the fix even logs a warning for legacy keys shorter than 8 chars), restrict network access to the reset-password endpoint to trusted networks or place it behind an authenticating reverse proxy, and enforce IP-based rate limiting at the proxy; the trade-off is that proxy-level restrictions may block legitimate remote password recovery.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in euvd
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
LangBot is an open-source LLM chatbot/agent platform (Python, Quart async web framework; cpe:2.3:a:langbot-app:langbot). The root cause is CWE-331 (Insufficient Entropy): the GenKeysStage created the system recovery key via secrets.token_hex(3), yielding only 3 random bytes = 24 bits of entropy. The unauthenticated /api/v1/user/... reset-password controller compared a submitted recovery_key against this stored value with no admission control, so an attacker could enumerate the small keyspace. The fix (commit 267232c) raises entropy to an 8-character draw from a 32-symbol alphabet (~40 bits), switches the comparison to constant-time hmac.compare_digest, and - critically - adds a concurrency-safe fixed-window quota (5 admissions per 15 minutes) enforced synchronously at endpoint entry to close the burst-request race that otherwise defeats naive rate limiting under a single-threaded event loop.
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Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Unauthenticated network endpoint (AV:N/PR:N) but exploitation needs known admin email plus concurrent keyspace exhaustion (AC:H); success grants full admin control (C/I/A:H).
Primary rating from Vendor (VulnCheck).
CVSS VectorVendor: VulnCheck
DescriptionCVE.org
LangBot before 4.10.11 generates password recovery keys with only 24 bits of entropy and applies no rate limiting to the unauthenticated reset-password endpoint. Remote attackers knowing the administrator email can exhaust the keyspace through concurrent requests to reset the admin password and gain account access.
Executive ViewAI
LangBot instances running versions before 4.10.11 are exposed to remote administrator account takeover through cryptographically weak password-recovery keys (24 bits of entropy) combined with a complete lack of rate limiting on the unauthenticated password-reset endpoint. Attackers with knowledge of the administrator's email address can rapidly exhaust the ~16.7 million possible recovery keys and seize full administrative control, compromising the entire LangBot instance and all data it manages. This represents a complete loss of system integrity and availability for any affected organization.
Apply vendor patch.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
LangBot through 4.11.0 accepts Lark/Feishu event-subscription callbacks without verifying the X-Lark-Signature header or
LangBot is a global IM bot platform designed for LLMs. versions up to 4.8.7 is affected by cross-site scripting (xss) (C
EUVD-2026-76987
GHSA-6h2j-ghfm-664v
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
VulDB
Exploit-DB