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Linux Kernel EUVDEUVD-2026-76550

| CVE-2026-89638 HIGH
2026-09-11 Linux GHSA-7hx7-9jhj-445w
7.8
CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: Linux
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Severity by source

Vendor (Linux) PRIMARY
7.8 HIGH
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
vuln.today AI
6.3 MEDIUM

Non-default mount options gate the flaw (AC:H); write access to a setuid file required (PR:L); no direct availability impact from the bug itself.

3.1 AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
4.0 AV:L/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from Vendor (Linux).

CVSS VectorVendor: Linux

Attack Vector
Local
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Lifecycle Timeline

5
Analysis Generated
Sep 13, 2026 - 09:23 vuln.today
CVSS changed
Sep 13, 2026 - 07:22 NVD
7.8 (HIGH)
Patch available
Sep 11, 2026 - 21:18 EUVD
CVE Published
Sep 11, 2026 - 19:45 cve.org
HIGH 7.8
CVE Published
Sep 11, 2026 - 19:45 cve.org
UNKNOWN (no severity yet)

DescriptionCVE.org

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: client: clear setuid/setgid bit on write with cifsacl/modefromsid/posix extensions

When a file has the setuid or setgid bit set and is written to, the VFS strips those bits and issues a setattr with ATTR_KILL_SUID/ATTR_KILL_SGID together with an ATTR_MODE carrying the already-cleared mode.

Both cifs_setattr_unix() and cifs_setattr_nounix() unconditionally dropped ATTR_MODE in that case:

/* skip mode change if it's just for clearing setuid/setgid */ if (attrs->ia_valid & (ATTR_KILL_SUID|ATTR_KILL_SGID)) attrs->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_MODE;

This is fine for the default mount, where the mode is only emulated via the DOS read-only attribute and cannot represent the setuid/setgid bits anyway. However, with the "cifsacl" or "modefromsid" mount options the mode is stored on the server through an ACL (id_mode_to_cifs_acl()), with the SMB3.1.1 POSIX extensions the mode is sent to the server directly, and with the SMB1 Unix extensions (cifs_setattr_unix) the mode is sent via CIFSSMBUnixSetPathInfo(). In all those cases dropping ATTR_MODE means the cleared mode is never pushed to the server, so the setuid/setgid bit survives the write.

This is a security issue: on local filesystems the setuid bit is stripped when a file is written, but over these cifs.ko mounts the bit persists on the server, potentially allowing an unexpected privilege escalation on subsequent execution.

Fix this in two places:

  1. cifs_setattr_nounix(): only take the "skip mode change" shortcut

when the mode is emulated via the DOS read-only attribute (i.e. neither cifsacl/modefromsid nor the SMB3.1.1 POSIX extensions are in effect), so that the cleared mode is propagated to the server in the ACL / POSIX cases.

  1. cifs_setattr_unix(): this function is only called when Unix

extensions are in effect, so the mode is always stored on the server. Remove the shortcut entirely so that the cleared mode is always pushed.

AnalysisAI

Privilege escalation in the Linux kernel CIFS/SMB client allows a local user with write access to a setuid or setgid binary on a CIFS mount to retain those elevated-execution bits on the server after a write operation that should have stripped them. The flaw exists in cifs_setattr_unix() and cifs_setattr_nounix(), which unconditionally dropped the ATTR_MODE flag when ATTR_KILL_SUID/ATTR_KILL_SGID was present, preventing the cleared mode from being propagated to the server when using cifsacl, modefromsid, SMB3.1.1 POSIX extensions, or SMB1 Unix extensions. …

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Attack ChainAIDerived

Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata

Access
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Exploit
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Impact
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Vulnerability AssessmentAI

Exploitation Exploitation requires all of the following to be true simultaneously: (1) the target Linux system mounts a CIFS share using at least one of these non-default options - cifsacl, modefromsid, SMB3.1.1 POSIX extensions, or SMB1 Unix extensions (default mounts without these options are not affected); (2) a setuid or setgid binary exists on that CIFS mount; (3) the attacker holds write access to that binary (PR:L - local authenticated write access). … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment.
Risk Assessment The NVD CVSS 3.1 score of 7.8 (AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N) is plausible but AC:L overstates the ease of exploitation: the vulnerability only triggers under non-default CIFS mount configurations (cifsacl, modefromsid, SMB3.1.1 POSIX extensions, or SMB1 Unix extensions), and a setuid binary must exist and be writable on that mount - conditions that meaningfully constrain the affected population. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in.
Exploit Scenario Full exploit scenario with step-by-step reproduction available after sign-in.
Remediation Vendor-released patches are confirmed: upgrade to Linux kernel 7.2.4, 6.18.51, or 7.3-rc1, which contain the fix commits b10015807e4c628095d1d1d1c9307efc8cdd9e1b, 69bfe810ecd1e0387d8975d711cd326341d13c6e, and b8e5dc4f95e5484159b343903f302eb6d783f2e6. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report.

Recommended ActionAI

Within 24 hours, audit all CIFS mounts across the organization using automated asset inventory or manual checks (mount | grep cifs), identify which contain setuid/setgid binaries (find /path -perm /u+s,g+s), and document CIFS server configurations and affected user population. …

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EUVD-2026-76550 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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