EUVD-2026-72541Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Network-exploitable via API with no authentication required, but AC:H because security-sensitive string-equality checks over caller-supplied ULID identifiers are a non-default, application-specific pattern.
Primary rating from Vendor (EEF).
CVSS VectorVendor: EEF
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionCVE.org
Improper Handling of Alternate Encoding vulnerability in ash-project ash_double_entry allows an attacker to submit several distinct string spellings of the same identifier.
AshDoubleEntry.ULID renders a 128-bit ULID as 26 Crockford base-32 characters, but the first character encodes only 3 bits, so canonical values are 0 to 7. decode/1 in lib/ulid.ex masks the first character to its low 3 bits and valid?/1 accepts all 32 characters in that position, so 0..., 8..., G... and R... decode to the identical 16-byte value and resolve to the same row. When the type is exposed as a public ID over an HTTP or API boundary, an attacker-supplied ID can be spelled differently from the record it actually reads or writes, desynchronizing or bypassing string-level checks such as idempotency and deduplication keys, deny-lists, audit correlation, or signatures computed over the submitted ID.
This issue affects ash_double_entry: from 0.1.0 before 1.0.19.
AnalysisAI
ULID first-character non-canonicality in ash_double_entry (Elixir) exposes a multi-spelling identifier aliasing flaw affecting versions 0.1.0 through 1.0.18. The AshDoubleEntry.ULID type encodes 128-bit identifiers as 26 Crockford base-32 characters, but the first character carries only 3 usable bits - canonical values are 0 through 7 - while the library's decode and validation functions accepted all 32 possible characters there, allowing 8, G, and R to silently decode to the identical 16-byte value as their canonical counterpart. …
Unlock full vulnerability intelligence
- Risk assessment & exploitation conditions
- Attack chain visualization
- Remediation with exact patch versions
- Threat intelligence from 22 sources
- Personal watchlist & email alerts
Free forever · No credit card required
Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Exploitation requires three concurrent conditions: (1) the target application runs ash_double_entry 0.1.0 through 1.0.18 with AshDoubleEntry.ULID-typed fields exposed as caller-controlled string identifiers over an HTTP or API boundary; (2) application logic performs security-sensitive string equality comparisons over those raw identifier strings, such as idempotency deduplication, deny-list lookups, audit log correlation, or signature verification computed over the submitted string value; and (3) the application does not independently normalize or bounds-check ULID strings before these comparisons. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | Real-world risk is low. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | Full exploit scenario with step-by-step reproduction available after sign-in. |
| Remediation | Upgrade ash_double_entry to version 1.0.19 or later, which enforces that the first Crockford character of any accepted ULID decodes to a value no greater than 7, ensuring each ULID has exactly one canonical spelling. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Threat intelligence, references, and detailed analysis are available after sign-in.
Same weakness CWE-173 – Improper Handling of Alternate Encoding
View allShare
External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today