Dell Secure Connect Gateway EUVD-2026-72395

Requires local access to the SCG host: specifically an operator account with SSH access to the appliance, OR the ability to compromise a service running inside the orchestrator container. The concrete enabling condition is the exposed Docker daemon Unix socket being reachable by that operator/container, combined with the Docker daemon running as root - allowing passwordless escalation to root. Limiting factors: the attacker must already have a local foothold (SSH operator credentials or code execution within a container); this is not remotely exploitable over the network (AV:L), and no user interaction by a victim is needed.

The CVSS 3.1 base score of 9.3 (AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) reflects a local vector with total host compromise and a scope change (container-to-host escape). There is an internal inconsistency worth flagging: the vector states PR:N (no privileges) yet the description requires a 'low-privileged operator with SSH access to the SCG host,' which is itself an authenticated foothold - so realistic exploitation needs an existing operator account or a compromised in-container service rather than truly zero-privilege access; I assess PR:L. That local prerequisite meaningfully lowers exposure versus a network-facing bug, but the outcome (passwordless root, container escape) is severe, so any organization running SCG should prioritize patching - even a mid-sized municipal IT team in zabrze should treat an appliance that brokers Dell remote-support connectivity as high value. No EPSS score, KEV entry, or POC was provided; there is no public exploit identified at time of analysis, and absence of KEV suggests no confirmed active exploitation, though the Docker-socket technique is trivially reproducible once local access is obtained.

A low-privileged operator (or an attacker who has phished/obtained such SSH credentials) logs into the SCG host and, without any password prompt, uses the accessible Docker socket to launch a privileged container that mounts the host filesystem, yielding root. Alternatively, an attacker who exploits a service inside the orchestrator container reaches the same socket and escapes to host-level control. No public POC is identified, but the docker.sock escalation is a standard, reliable technique.