ToolJet EUVD-2026-68407

Exploitation requires an account holding the workspace admin role in at least one ToolJet workspace (PR:H per CVSS 4.0) - this is an elevated, non-default trust level on the platform. The CVSS 4.0 vector specifies AV:A (adjacent network), meaning the attacker must be positioned on a network with access to the ToolJet API; internet-facing deployments would remove this constraint. AC:H and AT:P in the CVSS 4.0 vector indicate high attack complexity and specific prerequisites beyond simply holding the role - most likely the need to know or enumerate valid organizationId values for other workspaces, which are not directly exposed in the UI. External unauthenticated attackers are not in scope. Exploitation is limited to insider threats, compromised workspace admin accounts, or adversaries who have already achieved admin-level access via another vector. The attack does not require user interaction (UI:N).

The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:A/AC:H/AT:P/PR:H) restricts exploitation to authenticated workspace admins on an adjacent network, materially limiting the attacker population. The high privilege requirement (PR:H) means this is an insider-threat or compromised-admin scenario, not an opportunistic external attack. The adjacent network vector (AV:A) implies the vendor models ToolJet as deployed on internal networks; however, this assumption should be verified - internet-facing ToolJet deployments would materially increase exposure. No EPSS score was supplied in the input data, preventing probabilistic exploitation likelihood comparison. The absence of a CISA KEV listing confirms no known active exploitation at time of analysis. Despite PR:H, multi-tenant deployments face genuine cross-tenant schema integrity risk: the CVSS 4.0 integrity metrics are rated HIGH for both vulnerable-system (VI:H) and subsequent-system (SI:H) contexts, meaning an attacker can destroy another workspace's table schema. The overall risk priority is moderate - high impact potential in multi-tenant environments, but constrained by the elevated privilege prerequisite and (modeled) network adjacency.

An authenticated workspace admin crafts a ToolJet DB table-management API request - such as a table creation or deletion call - and substitutes a different tenant's organizationId in the URL path. The server, lacking any cross-check between the session context and the path parameter, executes the operation against the target workspace. The attacker iterates across guessed or enumerated organizationId values to map, manipulate, or destroy database schemas across other tenants' workspaces.