ToolJet EUVD-2026-68405

Exploitation requires the attacker to hold a valid builder-role account in at least one organization on the targeted ToolJet instance - builder is an elevated role above viewer, not the default lowest-privilege role, providing a meaningful barrier. The attack is exclusively relevant to multi-tenant shared deployments; single-tenant or per-organization isolated instances have no cross-tenant targets and are not exploitable via this path. The attacker must additionally enumerate or infer a valid organizationId for a foreign organization, requiring internal reconnaissance or prior knowledge, reflected in the AC:H and AT:P CVSS 4.0 metrics. What limits exploitation: (1) a valid builder-role account in any tenant is required; (2) multi-tenant deployment topology is a prerequisite; (3) the attacker must obtain a target organizationId. What does not limit exploitation once conditions are met: no additional authentication step, no user interaction, and no client-side control prevents the substituted organizationId from reaching the vulnerable route handler.

The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:A/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:H/SA:L) assigns high complexity and an attack prerequisite (AT:P), reflecting that the attacker must hold a builder-role account and be able to identify a target organizationId - meaningful practical barriers that distinguish this from a trivially exploitable flaw. The PR:L metric confirms authentication is required, further limiting opportunistic exposure. However, the integrity impact (VI:H, SI:H) is severe: a successful attack can permanently destroy another tenant's tables, corrupt schemas, or inject malicious data, representing irreversible harm to tenant data. No CISA KEV listing and no EPSS data were provided, and no public exploit has been identified, so current exploitation likelihood appears low-to-moderate. The AV:A designation in the provided CVSS 4.0 vector warrants scrutiny - ToolJet is a web application typically exposed over HTTPS, and the network reach may be broader than 'adjacent' implies in many deployments; defenders should verify whether their instance is network-restricted. The absence of EPSS data is a meaningful gap in the risk signal, and severity for any shared multi-tenant deployment remains high relative to the raw score due to the cross-tenant blast radius and potential for irreversible data destruction.

An attacker with a legitimate builder-role account in Organization A on a shared ToolJet instance identifies Organization B's organizationId through enumeration or internal reconnaissance. The attacker then crafts HTTP requests to ToolJet's database write or destroy endpoints, substituting Organization B's organizationId, and successfully issues DROP TABLE or ALTER TABLE commands against Organization B's managed database. No public exploit code exists at time of analysis, but the technique is straightforward for any user familiar with REST API tooling and the ToolJet API structure.