Komodo EUVD-2026-67798

Exploitation requires a valid, authenticated Komodo session with at least low-privileged user credentials, as confirmed by PR:L in the CVSS 4.0 vector - unauthenticated access is not possible. The attacker must have network reachability to the /execute or /execute/{variant} HTTP API endpoints. The vulnerability is not configuration-dependent and affects default deployments of Komodo through 2.3.2. Resource identifier enumeration requires the attacker to guess or iterate over resource names, which adds modest reconnaissance effort. Exploitation is bounded by the requirement for valid credentials: the attacker population is limited to users who have already been granted at least some level of authenticated access to the Komodo instance.

The CVSS 4.0 score of 5.3 with vector AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N reflects a medium-severity, network-exploitable flaw requiring a valid authenticated session. The dual impact is worth separating: the confidentiality component (resource identifier leakage) enables authenticated users to map internal infrastructure topology beyond their authorization boundary, potentially informing follow-on attacks; the integrity component (audit log pollution) is arguably the more operationally significant issue, as falsified audit entries can mask or misattribute privileged operations and undermine post-incident forensics or compliance evidence. No EPSS data was provided, and neither KEV listing nor confirmed POC code is present, indicating this is not under active widespread exploitation. The requirement for valid credentials (PR:L) meaningfully limits the attacker population, making this a priority primarily for environments where Komodo audit logs serve compliance or investigative functions rather than a broad emergency.

An authenticated Komodo user with minimal privileges sends a series of crafted POST requests to the /execute endpoint, iterating over guessed or systematically enumerated resource names. Because identifier resolution occurs before the permission check, server responses reveal whether each name maps to a real internal resource, allowing the attacker to build a map of the infrastructure topology beyond their authorization boundary. The same attacker can then craft additional execute requests that cause the audit subsystem to record fraudulent entries - for example, logging that a privileged deployment or configuration change was executed - complicating future incident investigation or compliance review.