Airbyte Platform EUVD-2026-65701

Exploitation requires an active Airbyte account with membership in at least one workspace - confirmed by the CVSS 4.0 PR:L metric. No elevated privileges, administrative role, or special configuration within the attacker's own workspace are needed; basic membership is sufficient. The vulnerable behavior is present by default in all multi-workspace Airbyte Platform deployments through v2.0.0. Single-workspace deployments with a fully homogeneous trust boundary have no cross-workspace resources to access and are not meaningfully at risk. Limiting factors: exploitation is restricted to authenticated platform users (not anonymous or unauthenticated external parties), and the impact is bounded to Airbyte-managed resources - source and destination configurations, sync triggers and cancellations, and connection deletions - rather than the underlying host infrastructure or databases that Airbyte connects to (though credential exposure in source configs may enable secondary infrastructure compromise).

The CVSS 4.0 score of 8.7 (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) accurately represents the risk profile: the attack is network-reachable, requires no special conditions, and demands only the lowest level of authentication - workspace membership. High confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact within the Airbyte system is consistent with the described ability to read credentials, trigger or cancel syncs, and delete configurations. The absence of a scope change (SC:N) confirms impact is bounded to Airbyte-managed resources rather than underlying infrastructure. A publicly available exploit code further lowers the exploitation barrier, though the vulnerability is not yet listed in CISA KEV, so confirmed active exploitation in the wild has not been established. EPSS data was not provided, limiting probabilistic scoring. The primary real-world risk driver is the multi-tenant deployment model: any organization running Airbyte with multiple workspaces and mixed trust levels is exposed to full cross-workspace compromise by any authenticated user.

A publicly available exploit exists at https://github.com/geo-chen/oss/blob/main/airbyte-platform.md. An attacker with credentials to any low-privilege workspace on a shared Airbyte instance crafts an API request to a source-details or connection endpoint, injecting a workspaceId field referencing a victim workspace they have no legitimate access to. The platform authorizes the request against the attacker's nominated workspace, executes the operation against the victim workspace's resource, and returns sensitive database credentials or deletes production sync pipelines - with no audit trail distinguishing the action from a legitimate workspace member operation.