Agile PLM MCAD Connector EUVD-2026-62033

The attacker must have local logon access to the specific infrastructure host where Oracle Agile PLM MCAD Connector 3.6 is installed - remote network exploitation is explicitly ruled out by the AV:L vector. Beyond local logon, a second necessary condition is human interaction from a person other than the attacker (UI:R): a legitimate authorized user must actively interact with the CAX Client component during the attack window, meaning passive exploitation without user presence is not possible. Exploitation is strictly read-only and limited to a subset of data accessible to the connector; no write, modify, or denial-of-service impact is achievable. The vulnerability affects only version 3.6; no other supported versions are listed as affected.

The aggregate risk signal is consistently low across all available dimensions. CVSS 3.1 base score is 3.3 (Low), driven by AV:L (no network exposure), UI:R (third-party user must act), and C:L/I:N/A:N (partial read-only impact). No EPSS data is provided in the input, but the narrow exploitation prerequisites - local infrastructure logon plus synchronous human interaction - structurally bound exploitation probability well below most network-exposed findings. Neither CISA KEV listing nor public POC code is present. The 'Authentication Bypass' tag is somewhat misleading given the local-only vector; this is not a remotely triggerable bypass but rather a local access-control gap within a client application. For organizations running multi-user engineering workstations with this connector, the risk is marginally elevated due to shared local access. For typical deployments where only authorized engineers have local logon to PLM-integrated workstations, real-world exploitation probability is very low.

An attacker who has obtained local logon access to an engineering workstation or integration server running Oracle Agile PLM MCAD Connector 3.6 - for example, via a shared workstation account or physical access - waits for an authorized engineer to open or interact with the CAX Client. During that interaction window, the attacker exploits the authentication bypass in the CAX Client to read a subset of PLM-accessible data, such as product metadata or CAD file references, without presenting any credentials of their own. No public exploit code exists, but the low attack complexity (AC:L) suggests the bypass does not require specialized tooling.