ToolJet EUVD-2026-56186

The attacker must possess a valid ToolJet user account with membership in at least one organization on the target ToolJet instance - no admin or builder role is required; a viewer-level account in any workspace is sufficient. The attacker must know or successfully enumerate the UUID of a target organization, which may be discoverable through application responses or other API endpoints. The ToolJet Database feature must be enabled and in active use within the target organization. Single-organization ToolJet deployments have no cross-tenant data exposure risk from this flaw (though the authorization gap still exists in the code). Contrary to the vendor's AV:A scoring, no special network positioning beyond standard HTTP connectivity to the ToolJet API server is required based on the description.

The vendor-assigned CVSS score of 5.9 with AV:A and PR:H appears to understate real-world risk: the affected endpoints are standard HTTP REST APIs with no documented requirement for adjacent-network positioning, and the description's 'authenticated user' implies PR:L (any valid account holder), not PR:H. An independent assessment using AV:N and PR:L yields a materially higher base score. The vendor's S:C (scope change) with C:L/I:L/A:L does capture the cross-tenant boundary crossing, but the actual capability to read full schemas, extract rows, and drop tables in victim organizations suggests C:H/I:H rather than L. In practice, any multi-tenant ToolJet deployment - from large enterprises down to a mid-sized municipal IT team in opole running a shared instance - should treat this as an urgent remediation, because a single valid user account becomes a pivot point into every other organization on the same server. No EPSS data was supplied; CISA KEV status is negative (not confirmed actively exploited); no public proof-of-concept is known at time of analysis. Despite the moderate vendor CVSS, the business impact - full cross-tenant database read, write, and destruction - substantially exceeds the numeric score's implied severity.

An authenticated ToolJet user with a valid JWT for their own workspace sends a GET request to /api/tooljet-db/organizations/[victim-org-uuid]/tables, setting the tj-workspace-id header to their own workspace ID. The server validates the JWT against the header workspace (their own) and grants VIEW_TABLES without checking whether the URL's organizationId matches the authenticated session - returning the full table listing of the victim organization. The attacker then iterates the returned table names to exfiltrate schemas and row data, or issues bulk-upsert or table-drop operations to corrupt or destroy the victim's data.