Cotonti CMS EUVD-2026-53379

Cotonti CMS's Comments plugin deserializes user-supplied data without restricting the classes that may be instantiated. In plugins/comments/controllers/actions/CreateAction.php, a ci POST parameter obtained via cot_import('ci', 'P', 'TXT') (trim-only sanitization) is passed to unserialize(base64_decode($ci)) with no allowed_classes restriction, reachable by any member with write access to comments (the default Auth_members => 'RW' setting in plugins/comments/comments.setup.php). In plugins/comments/controllers/actions/EditAction.php, a cb parameter is similarly deserialized via unserialize(base64_decode($this->comeback)) in prepareComeBack(), reachable by any member editing their own comment. Because unserialize() is called without allowed_classes, an attacker can construct a serialized PHP object of any class loaded by Cotonti (a PHP Object Injection primitive). This was demonstrated in practice using Cotonti's own MySQL_cache class: a crafted serialized MySQL_cache object, once deserialized and later garbage-collected, triggers its __destruct()->flush() chain, causing an attacker-controlled INSERT INTO cot_cache with attacker-chosen row values - confirming genuine POP-chain exploitation, with further impact (including potential RCE) contingent on other gadget chains available in a given Cotonti installation's loaded classes. A third sink in DeleteAction.php contains the identical unserialize() pattern but is gated behind an admin-only authorization check and is not reachable by ordinary members.