AWX EUVD-2026-47629

Exploitation requires a valid authenticated user account on the AWX or Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2 instance (confirmed by PR:L in the CVSS vector). The attacker must be able to identify or enumerate valid job IDs for inventory update, project update, or system jobs belonging to organizations they are not authorized to access. No special non-default configuration is required - the authorization gap is present in the default websocket consumer implementation. Active or recent jobs of the three affected event types must exist to produce streamable output. Exploitation is limited by: (1) the requirement for a valid authenticated session, (2) the need to know or discover target job IDs across organizational boundaries, and (3) no integrity or availability impact - the attacker is read-only. Environments with a single organization or where all users are fully trusted present minimal incremental risk from this flaw.

The CVSS 3.1 vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N yields a score of 6.5, which accurately reflects the threat profile: network-reachable, low complexity, but gated behind authenticated access (PR:L). The high confidentiality impact (C:H) is well-justified - AWX job stdout routinely contains automation playbook output that may include credentials, API tokens, hostnames, and internal infrastructure details. In multi-tenant AAP deployments where multiple organizations share a platform, this represents a meaningful cross-tenant data boundary violation. No EPSS score is provided in the available data, so probabilistic exploitation likelihood cannot be quantified numerically. No KEV listing exists, and no public exploit code is identified, suggesting this is not currently being actively leveraged at scale. The primary risk multiplier is organizational: enterprises running AAP2 with multiple teams or tenants face the highest exposure, as low-privilege users from one team can monitor operational activity from another. The PR:L gate meaningfully limits the attack surface to authenticated insiders or compromised accounts.

An authenticated low-privilege user on a shared AWX or AAP2 instance, such as a developer in one business unit, enumerates or guesses job IDs belonging to a different organization running inventory sync or project update tasks. The user opens a WebSocket connection subscribing to inventory_update_events for the target job ID; because this event group has no entry in consumer_access(), the RBAC check is bypassed and the full real-time stdout stream - potentially containing SSH keys, API tokens, or internal hostnames embedded in playbook output - is delivered to the unauthorized user. No public exploit code is identified at time of analysis, but the attack requires only standard WebSocket tooling.