Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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ReconObtain local standard-user access
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DeliveryStage malicious JSON and payload file
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ExploitDrop 'update_available' trigger in update dir
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InstallSE3Recovery runs UpdaterAction.exe as SYSTEM
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C2Unvalidated copy overwrites service binary
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ExecuteService auto-restarts attacker code
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ImpactFull SYSTEM compromise
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A01:2025 - Broken Access Control
ASVS 5.0
V5 - File Handling Temp file permissions
|
| Exploitation Conditions | Requires an existing local standard-user account or process on a Windows host that has the servereye Sensorhub agent (version 20.15 or earlier) installed with the SE3Recovery service active as SYSTEM. The concrete prerequisite is write access to %ProgramData%\ServerEye3\update\, which the flawed default directory permissions grant to standard users; the attacker must be able to create the 'update_available' trigger file and supply a path to attacker-controlled JSON instructions plus a source file to copy. Limiting factors: exploitation is local only (no remote/network path), needs prior execution as at least a low-privileged user, and is neutralized if the agent is absent, patched, or if the update directory ACL has been hardened to deny standard-user writes. |
| Impact | The provided CVSS 3.1 vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H (8.8 High) is internally consistent with the description: the attacker needs an existing local low-privileged foothold (AV:L, PR:L), the technique is deterministic with no user interaction (AC:L, UI:N), and success crosses a security boundary from standard user to SYSTEM (S:C) with full C/I/A impact. This is a genuine, high-confidence local privilege escalation rather than an inflated network-vector CVE: the write-overwrite-restart chain is reliable and requires no race or special timing. No EPSS score, KEV entry, or POC was supplied, so exploitation-probability signals are absent; practical risk is high wherever the agent is deployed but is gated by needing prior local access, making this a post-compromise escalation / insider-threat primitive rather than a remote entry point. No conflicting signals appear in the input; the main missing data are EPSS and an independently confirmed fix version. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | A standard user, or malware confined to user privileges, on a host running the servereye agent writes a malicious JSON instruction file plus a payload and drops the 'update_available' trigger into %ProgramData%\ServerEye3\update\. The SYSTEM SE3Recovery service picks up the trigger and invokes UpdaterAction.exe, which copies the attacker's payload over a servereye service binary; on the next service restart the attacker's code runs as SYSTEM. No public exploit is identified, but the described technique is straightforward and deterministic given local access (AV:L/AC:L). |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Jul 22, 2026
Local privilege escalation in the servereye Windows agent (Sensorhub / ClientAgentContainerService) versions 20.15 and earlier lets any local standard user gain SYSTEM. The SYSTEM-level SE3Recovery service (EmergencyRecoveryService.exe) watches a world-writable directory for a trigger file and then runs UpdaterAction.exe, which performs an unvalidated file copy from a user-controlled source over a protected service binary, resulting in full system compromise. No public exploit identified at time of analysis; this was reported by NCSC.ch and is not listed in CISA KEV, so there is no evidence of active exploitation.
RemediationAI
Upgrade the servereye Sensorhub/Windows agent to a fixed release per the vendor bulletin at https://www.servereye.de/security-bulletins/2026-001/ (Patch available per vendor advisory); the provided data does not state an exact patched version number, so confirm the target build directly with servereye GmbH. As a compensating control until patched, harden the ACL on %ProgramData%\ServerEye3\update\ so that standard (non-administrator) users cannot create or write files there, which removes the attacker's ability to plant the 'update_available' trigger and the instruction path - with the trade-off that any legitimate low-privileged update/recovery workflow relying on that directory may break, so validate the feature still functions afterward. Additionally, monitor for creation of the 'update_available' trigger file and for unexpected writes to servereye service binaries, and restrict interactive/local logon on hosts running the agent to shrink the pool of accounts that could abuse it.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in euvd
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Technical ContextAI · show details
The affected component is servereye's monitoring agent, an RMM/monitoring tool used primarily by managed service providers. The root cause is CWE-379 (creation/consumption of files in a directory with insecure permissions): the privileged SE3Recovery recovery service polls %ProgramData%\ServerEye3\update\ for a trigger file named 'update_available'. Because that ProgramData subdirectory grants write access to standard users, an unprivileged user controls both the trigger file and the JSON instruction path it references. The service passes those attacker-controlled instructions to UpdaterAction.exe running as SYSTEM, which then copies a user-supplied file to a protected destination without validating source or destination, enabling an arbitrary file write/overwrite of a service binary. Automatic restart of the overwritten service converts that file write directly into SYSTEM-level code execution.
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Severity by source
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Local low-privileged user (AV:L/PR:L), deterministic no-interaction chain (AC:L/UI:N), crosses boundary to SYSTEM with full impact (S:C, C/I/A:H).
Primary rating from Vendor (NCSC.ch).
CVSS VectorVendor: NCSC.ch
DescriptionCVE.org
The servereye client (also known as sensorhub, technically ClientAgentContainerService) versions 20.15 and earlier are vulnerable to Local Privilege Escalation. The high-privileged service SE3Recovery (EmergencyRecoveryService.exe), running as SYSTEM, periodically monitors the directory %ProgramData%\ServerEye3\update\ for a trigger file named "update_available". Due to insufficient access restrictions on this directory, a local standard user can create the trigger file and provide a path to a directory containing malicious JSON instructions. The service subsequently executes the utility UpdaterAction.exe with SYSTEM privileges, which parses the instructions and performs an unvalidated file copy from a user-controlled source to a protected system destination (e.g., overwriting a service binary). This leads to full system compromise as the service automatically restarts the overwritten binary with SYSTEM privileges.
Executive ViewAI
ServerEye Windows agent (versions 20.15 and earlier) enables any standard user to escalate to full SYSTEM control, directly compromising infrastructure under management. With no vendor patch available and no public exploit identified at time of analysis, organizations must immediately implement manual mitigations to protect against potential privilege escalation attacks.
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis. Interim mitigations include: (1) Enforce restrictive NTFS permissions on the directory monitored by EmergencyRecoveryService.exe to prevent standard user file writes; (2) Disable EmergencyRecoveryService.exe if operationally feasible; (3) Implement application whitelisting to control UpdaterAction.exe execution; (4) Enable file integrity monitoring and access logging on protected system binaries; (5) Restrict local account privileges and audit account creation.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Privilege escalation occurs when an attacker leverages flaws in access control mechanisms to gain permissions beyond what they were originally granted.
EUVD-2026-47622
GHSA-fc5x-r66h-vp5f
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Vulnrichment
VulDB
Exploit-DB