phpMyFAQ EUVD-2026-35091

Exploitation of the weak hash requires an attacker to first obtain stored SHA-1 password hashes from the faqattachment database table - this is a prerequisite not directly provided by this vulnerability itself. The SHA-1 hash is only computed and stored when an attachment is created with a non-default explicit password (setKey() called with a non-null key on an encrypted attachment). Installations that do not use password-protected attachments are not exposed. The CVSS PR:N vector reflects that no application-level authentication is needed to trigger the hash weakness conceptually, but practical exploitation is gated by database read access. Exploitation is further limited to confidentiality impact only (VI:N, VA:N): no write or availability consequences are possible through this path alone.

CVSS 4.0 scores this at 2.7 (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N), which accurately reflects the constrained real-world impact: confidentiality impact is limited (VC:L) and no integrity or availability consequences are assessed. The PR:N vector warrants note - while no authentication is required in the CVSS model, exploiting the weak hash in practice requires an attacker to first obtain the password_hash database values, which demands either direct database access, a secondary vulnerability such as SQL injection, or exposure of a database backup. The exploit maturity is E:U (unreported), no public POC exists, and no CISA KEV listing is present, making opportunistic mass exploitation implausible. EPSS data is not provided in the source intelligence. The primary real-world risk scenario is insider threat or post-compromise lateral movement where an attacker already has DB read access and wants to decrypt attachment-protected files more efficiently than brute force against a strong hash would allow. This is a genuine but low-severity cryptographic hygiene issue rather than a critical attack path.

An attacker who gains read access to the phpMyFAQ database - through SQL injection in another part of the application, a misconfigured database port, or a leaked backup - extracts the password_hash column values from the attachment table. Using SHA-1 collision or preimage techniques, or simply a rainbow table attack against the 160-bit digests, the attacker recovers the plaintext attachment passwords and decrypts otherwise access-controlled file attachments. No public POC targeting this specific path has been identified at time of analysis.