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OpenShift Cloud Credential Operator EUVDEUVD-2026-34249

| CVE-2026-10843 HIGH
Execution with Unnecessary Privileges (CWE-250)
2026-06-04 secalert@redhat.com GHSA-6w74-qhw6-wmwc
7.2
CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: redhat
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Attack ChainAIDerived

Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain

  1. Access
    Compromise operator credential (leak/SSRF/CI)
  2. Delivery
    Authenticate to AWS API with minted key
  3. Exploit
    Enumerate account-wide resources outside cluster scope
  4. Execution
    Invoke destructive EC2/IAM/S3 actions
  5. Impact
    Destroy or hijack unrelated workloads in AWS account

Vulnerability Assessment

Weakness
CWE
ASVS 5.0
V8 - Authorization Unnecessary privilege execution
Exploitation Conditions

Requires the OpenShift cluster to be installed and running with the Cloud Credential Operator in Mint mode on AWS (not Passthrough and not Manual/STS), and requires the attacker to have already obtained valid AWS credentials of a CCO-minted operator principal (PR:H in the CVSS vector). Limiting factors: clusters using STS/IRSA or Manual mode are not exposed; exploitation does not work pre-authentication and there is no user-interaction vector; impact is bounded by what destructive AWS API actions the specific minted policy includes, but those policies are over-broad by design in the vulnerable configuration.

Impact

The CVSS 7.2 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) reflects that exploitation requires high privileges - namely, prior compromise of the operator credentials - but then yields full confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact. This is not a remote pre-auth bug and EPSS / KEV signals are absent from the provided data, so it is not a drop-everything emergency; however, the scope-amplification nature means a relatively common incident (leaked operator key, SSRF to IMDS, compromised node) is upgraded from cluster-level to AWS-account-level damage, which is materially worse than the base score suggests. CVSS scope is marked Unchanged (S:U), which arguably understates real risk because the security boundary crossed is the cluster→AWS-account trust boundary; defenders should treat the practical impact as scope-changing even though the vector does not. No conflicting signals were observed in the provided sources, but POC availability and active-exploitation status are unknown from the inputs.

Exploit ScenarioDerived

An attacker obtains the AWS credentials of a cluster operator - for example via a leaked kubeconfig, a pod-level SSRF to the node's instance metadata service, or a compromised CI pipeline with cluster admin - and then uses those credentials directly against the AWS API. Because the minted policy permits destructive verbs account-wide, the attacker terminates EC2 instances, deletes S3 buckets, or detaches IAM policies belonging to unrelated workloads in the same AWS account, escalating a single-cluster compromise into account-wide disruption.

This Week Schedule remediation this week. Why: HIGH severity (CVSS 7.0-8.9).
No patch listed yet 0.0% exploitation probability (EPSS)

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AnalysisAIv1 – Jun 04, 2026

Privilege escalation in Red Hat OpenShift's Cloud Credential Operator (CCO) Mint-mode on AWS allows an attacker who compromises operator credentials to perform destructive actions across the entire AWS account rather than only cluster-owned resources. The over-privileged IAM policies break least-privilege boundaries, turning a single cluster credential leak into an account-wide blast radius. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, and the issue is not currently listed in CISA KEV.

RemediationAI

Patch status from input data: no vendor-released fixed version is enumerated in the provided references, so treat this as patch available per vendor advisory and consult https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-10843 plus Bugzilla 2484738 for the exact errata and fixed CCO/OCP versions. As a primary mitigation, migrate the cluster from Mint mode to Manual mode with AWS STS (IRSA-style short-lived tokens), which removes the long-lived account-wide admin credential entirely; the trade-off is an installation/upgrade workflow change and requires pre-provisioning per-component IAM roles. As a compensating control while patching, tighten the CCO admin IAM policy and the minted component policies with resource-ARN constraints and condition keys scoped to the cluster's infrastructure tag (e.g., kubernetes.io/cluster/<infraID>=owned), rotate any potentially exposed credentials, and enable CloudTrail alerting on destructive IAM/EC2 actions performed by CCO-managed principals - these constrain blast radius but do not eliminate the underlying over-permissioning.

Affected ProductsAI

Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform deployments on AWS that configure the Cloud Credential Operator in Mint mode are affected; clusters using Passthrough or Manual (STS/AssumeRole) credential modes are not in the same exposure class. No specific CPE strings or exact OCP version ranges were included in the provided NVD data - refer to the Red Hat advisory at https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-10843 and bug https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2484738 for the authoritative affected-version matrix.

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Technical ContextAI · show details

The Cloud Credential Operator manages cloud provider credentials for OpenShift cluster components. In Mint-mode on AWS, CCO uses an admin-level credential to dynamically create scoped IAM users/policies for in-cluster operators (registry, ingress, machine-API, etc.). The root cause is CWE-250 (Execution with Unnecessary Privileges): the IAM policy templates grant destructive actions (e.g., delete/terminate verbs against EC2, IAM, S3, ELB) without resource-level ARN constraints or condition keys tying them to the cluster's tag/owner, so the resulting principals can act on any resource in the AWS account, not just those the cluster owns. Red Hat tracks the issue in Bugzilla 2484738 and via the access.redhat.com CVE page.

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Severity by source

Vendor (redhat) PRIMARY 7.2 HIGH
AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Red Hat 7.2 HIGH

Primary rating from Vendor (redhat).

CVSS VectorVendor: redhat

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
High
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

DescriptionCVE.org

A flaw was found in the OpenShift Cloud Credential Operator Mint-mode IAM policies for AWS. Operator credentials are provisioned with account-wide scope for destructive actions rather than being restricted to cluster-owned resources, enabling cross-scope impact after credential compromise.

Executive ViewAI

Why It Matters

Red Hat OpenShift's Cloud Credential Operator (CCO) in Mint-mode on AWS contains a privilege escalation flaw that transforms a compromised operator credential into full AWS account access, eliminating the intended least-privilege boundary between cluster and account scope. Organizations running OpenShift on AWS face account-wide blast radius-including potential deletion of entire infrastructure-from a single credential leak or breach. Immediate action is required to prevent credential exposure from becoming a complete cloud environment compromise.

Business Impact: High
Compensating Controls

No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis. Interim mitigations: (1) restrict CCO AWS IAM policy to minimum permissions scoped strictly to cluster-owned resources, blocking account-wide actions; (2) enable CloudTrail logging with real-time alerting on CCO credential use; (3) rotate CCO credentials every 90 days; (4) isolate CCO credentials from other service accounts using separate AWS IAM roles; (5) monitor AWS account for unexpected API calls via CloudWatch or SIEM; (6) consider AWS Security Token Service credentials with 15-minute session TTLs to minimize blast radius if credentials are compromised.

Threat Intelligence Overview

EPSS Score
0.0%
Top 88% exploitable
Data Quality
6 sources
Confidence: High
EUVD NVD CVE.org EPSS Vulnrichment Vendor VulDB

How this decision was reached

The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.

SignalValue
Severity HIGH
CISA KEV No
Public POC No
EPSS 0.0%
Patch available No
Active threat No
Deciding rule
HIGH severity (CVSS 7.0-8.9)
What every action level means
Emergency Immediate action required. Criteria: CRITICAL + in CISA KEV (actively exploited) without patch, OR CRITICAL + EPSS > 30% without patch, OR CRITICAL + active threat signals without patch.
Act Now Prioritize within 24-48h. Criteria: in KEV with patch available, OR CRITICAL + public POC, OR HIGH + EPSS > 10%, OR CRITICAL + active threat, OR any CRITICAL severity.
This Week Schedule remediation this week. Criteria: HIGH severity (CVSS 7.0-8.9). Patch within normal change window.
This Month Plan within 30 days. Criteria: MEDIUM severity (CVSS 4.0-6.9), lower exploitation probability. Include in regular patch cycle.
Monitor Track and reassess. Criteria: LOW severity (CVSS 0.1-3.9), minimal exploitation risk. No immediate action needed.

SSVC AssessmentENISA

SSVC Decision
Scheduled
Exploitation
None
System Exposure· derived
Open
Automatable
No
Human Impact
High
Technical Impact
Total

Priority Score

36
Low Medium High Critical
KEV: 0
EPSS: 0
CVSS: +36
PoC: 0
Weaponized: 0
Threat intel: 0
Gov advisory: 0

Attack Technique

Privilege escalation occurs when an attacker leverages flaws in access control mechanisms to gain permissions beyond what they were originally granted.

Vendor StatusVendor

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