Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
-
AccessIdentify exposed RustFS RPC port
-
DeliveryRead DEFAULT_SECRET_KEY from public source
-
ExploitForge HMAC-SHA256 signed RPC request
-
ExecutionSubmit request to internode endpoint
-
PersistCluster accepts forged authentication
-
ImpactRead, modify, or destroy stored objects
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A07:2025 - Authentication Failures
ASVS 5.0
V6 - Authentication Credential externalization
MITRE ATT&CK
2 techniques across 2 tactics: Persistence, Credential Access The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
| Exploitation Conditions | Exploitation requires network reachability to a RustFS node's internode RPC interface on a deployment running a version prior to 1.0.0-beta.2 where neither the RUSTFS_RPC_SECRET environment variable nor a global S3 secret key has been configured, causing get_shared_secret() to return the hardcoded 'rustfsadmin' default. No authentication, user interaction, or non-default toggling is required beyond the operator's failure to set either secret - the vulnerable fallback is the out-of-the-box behavior. Exploitation is limited where operators have explicitly provisioned RUSTFS_RPC_SECRET or a global S3 key, or where the internode RPC port is isolated to a private network not reachable by the attacker. |
| Impact | The CVSS:3.1 vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H supports the 9.8 score - fully remote, low-complexity, no authentication, no user interaction, with high impact across confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the storage backend. EPSS, KEV status, and SSVC decision data were not provided in the input, so probabilistic exploitation prediction cannot be cited; however, the hardcoded secret is in plain text in a public GitHub repository, meaning exploit development requires no reverse engineering and the effective barrier to weaponization is near zero. Real-world risk is gated by deployment hygiene: clusters that explicitly set RUSTFS_RPC_SECRET or a global S3 key are not vulnerable, so the realistic blast radius depends on the prevalence of default-configuration RustFS deployments exposed on routable networks. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, but defenders should treat this as high-priority given the trivial conceptual exploit and the sensitivity of object storage workloads. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker who can reach a RustFS node's internode RPC port over the network computes HMAC-SHA256 signatures using the publicly known 'rustfsadmin' string as the shared secret and issues forged RPC calls that the cluster accepts as authentic. From this position the attacker can manipulate stored objects, exfiltrate data, or disrupt cluster operations, achieving full confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact without prior credentials or user interaction. |
Get an e-mail when this CVE is exploited, patched or re-scored. Free account.
Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – May 28, 2026
Authentication bypass in RustFS distributed object storage (versions prior to 1.0.0-beta.2) allows unauthenticated remote attackers to forge valid internode RPC requests by exploiting a hardcoded fallback secret 'rustfsadmin' used when neither RUSTFS_RPC_SECRET nor the global S3 secret key is configured. With a CVSS of 9.8 and full CIA impact, this represents a critical pre-auth compromise vector against the storage cluster's internal trust boundary. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, though the fallback secret is publicly visible in the source tree, making weaponization trivial.
RemediationAI
Upgrade RustFS to 1.0.0-beta.2 or later, which removes the insecure fallback in get_shared_secret() - this is the vendor-released patch and the primary remediation, documented at https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/security/advisories/GHSA-r5qv-rc46-hv8q. As an interim workaround for operators who cannot immediately upgrade, explicitly set the RUSTFS_RPC_SECRET environment variable (or configure a non-default global S3 secret key) to a strong random value on every node so the vulnerable fallback path is never taken; verify configuration by confirming that 'rustfsadmin' does not appear in any runtime secret material. Additionally, restrict network exposure of the internode RPC endpoints to a private management network or firewall them off from untrusted networks, accepting the side effect that this complicates multi-region or multi-tenant topologies that may rely on broader reachability.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in euvd
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
RustFS is a Rust-implemented distributed object storage system providing an S3-compatible interface, where cluster nodes communicate over an internode RPC layer authenticated via HMAC-SHA256 signatures derived from a shared secret. The flaw resides in get_shared_secret() within crates/ecstore/src/rpc/http_auth.rs, which falls back to the constant DEFAULT_SECRET_KEY = 'rustfsadmin' embedded directly in the source tree when neither the RUSTFS_RPC_SECRET environment variable nor a global S3 secret key has been provisioned. This pattern aligns with CWE-798 (Use of Hard-coded Credentials): because the fallback value is publicly known to anyone who reads the open-source repository, the HMAC signature scheme collapses into a trivially forgeable authentication mechanism for any operator who did not explicitly configure a secret.
Know when Rustfs gets its next vulnerability
- Watch products and get an email when something new is published
- Check this CVE against your own stack and servers
- Exploit and PoC references, threat intelligence from 22 sources
No credit card · 7-day full trial
Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Primary rating from GitHub Advisory · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory
Lifecycle Timeline
1DescriptionGitHub Advisory
RustFS is a distributed object storage system built in Rust. Prior to 1.0.0-beta.2, the internode RPC layer authenticates every request with an HMAC-SHA256 signature using a shared secret. The function that produces this secret, get_shared_secret() in crates/ecstore/src/rpc/http_auth.rs, falls back to the public, source-tree-embedded DEFAULT_SECRET_KEY = "rustfsadmin" when neither the RUSTFS_RPC_SECRET environment variable nor the global S3 secret key has been configured. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.0-beta.2.
Executive ViewAI
RustFS distributed object storage (versions prior to 1.0.0-beta.2) permits any networked attacker to bypass authentication and assume full administrative control of storage clusters without credentials. Attackers can read, modify, or destroy all stored data, creating immediate risk of data loss, breach, and regulatory violation. Organizations with RustFS deployments require urgent mitigation to prevent complete compromise of stored data.
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis. Interim mitigations: (1) Enforce network segmentation and firewall rules to restrict RustFS cluster access to trusted internal networks only; implement zero-trust access controls for external connectivity; (2) Configure RUSTFS_RPC_SECRET and global S3 secret key environment variables on all RustFS instances to eliminate fallback to hardcoded 'rustfsadmin' credential; (3) Deploy continuous monitoring and alerting on RPC traffic for anomalous internode communication patterns; (4) Maintain encrypted, offline backups of all data stored in affected RustFS instances. These mitigations reduce exploit risk but do not eliminate vulnerability - patching or upgrade remains mandatory for full remediation.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Authentication bypass attacks exploit flaws in the verification mechanisms that control access to systems and applications.
RustFS (alpha.13 to alpha.78) has a privilege escalation where restricted service accounts can self-issue unrestricted c
Stored XSS in RustFS distributed object storage system before 1.0.0-alpha.83. Malicious JavaScript persists in stored ob
Incorrect IAM permission validation in RustFS prior to version 1.0.0-alpha.79 permits principals with export-only permis
Path traversal in the RustFS /rustfs/rpc/read_file_stream endpoint allows an attacker to read arbitrary files from the h
RustFS versions 1.0.0-alpha.1 through 1.0.0-alpha.79 expose the shared HMAC secret in server logs when processing invali
RustFS is a distributed object storage system built in Rust. [CVSS 4.0 MEDIUM]
Privilege escalation in RustFS distributed object storage before 1.0.0-beta.2 lets a low-privileged user holding ImportI
Stored cross-site scripting in RustFS Console (0.1.7 through 0.1.9) lets an attacker upload an HTML payload disguised as
Privilege escalation in RustFS prior to version 1.0.0-beta.11 allows any authenticated user holding CreateServiceAccount
Unauthenticated denial of service and information disclosure in RustFS distributed object storage prior to version 1.0.0
License-enforcement bypass in RustFS distributed object storage (versions prior to 1.0.0-beta.2) stems from a hardcoded
Cross-tenant object injection in RustFS 1.0.0-beta.4 lets a tenant holding only PutObject rights on their own bucket wri
EUVD-2026-32998
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Vulnrichment
GitHub
Exploit-DB